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Preface 
Adolf Hitler's view of his own political mission rested upon the 
basis of his W eltanschauung 1 and was therefore primarily a commit-
ment to an ideology rather than a course of action dictated by 
pragmatic considerations. At the center of his ideology lay a per-
sonal belief that man's problems can and must be solved by force 
alone. 2 The preeminence of the role of force in Hitler's thinking 
was closely tied to his idea of what constitutes a strong and healthy 
nation. He saw the major cause of the decline of Germany after 
World War I as her inability to maintain the purity of the race just 
as he attributed the decline of all civilizations throughout history 
to a simple case of "blood poisoning" by inferior peoples.3 Although 
Hitler never defined exactly what he meant by "race" or "Aryan," 
he used these terms to demonstrate that there existed a fundamental 
inequality between peoples and nations. 
In his mind, inequality was a law of nature and, as he reasoned 
in Mein Kampf, "All world historical events are only the expression 
of the racial instinct of self-preservation" of racial purity.4 A politi-
cal system which was based upon equality of individuals and which 
operated on the basis of majority decisions he looked upon as the 
source of all the evils which had befallen mankind. Hitler publicly 
stated that there "are two closely related factors which we were 
able to trace time and time again in periods of national decline. One 
is that the levelling idea of the supremacy of the numbers-called 
democracy-is substituted for the concept of the value of the 
individual personality, and the other is . . . the denial of any 
difference in the inborn capacity of individual peoples." 5 Inter-
nationalism and democracy were therefore rejected in favor of a 
racially based nationalism and an elitist individualism. But indi-
vidualism in Hitler's understanding of the word had nothing to do 
with the personal liberties and individual rights common to western 
tradition. "National Socialism takes as the starting point . . . 
1. The term W eltanschauung in its original meaning ( as used by Wilhelm Dilthey) 
stood for man's attempt to embrace entire reality in his philosophy of life. See Gerhard 
Masur, Prophets of Yesterday: Studies in European Culture 1890-1914 (New York: Harper 
Colophon Books, 1966 ), 164 ff. 
Hitler, however, narrowed its meaning to an uncompromising ideological position 
which served as the basis for the philosophy and the program of the National Socialist 
German Workers Party. 
2. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Muenchen: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Franz Eber Nachf., 
1944), p. 418. 
3. Ibid., pp. 310, 316. 
4 . Ibid., p. 324. 
5. Speech by Adolf Hitler on January 27, 1932 at Duesseldorf, cited in Max Domarus 
(ed.)l Hitler: Reden and Proklamationen 1932-1945, Vol. I: Triumph (2 vols.; Muenchen: 
Suedaeutscher Verlag, 1965 ), 71. 
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neither the individual nor humanity. . . It is important that 
the individual should slowly come to realize that his own ego is 
unimportant when compared with the existence of the whole 
people. . " 6 
"The individual is transitory," Hitler said, "the Volk is permanent." 
National Socialism saw in the Volk "the blood conditioned entity" 
and a "God-willed building stone of human society." 7 The function 
of an individual thus became submerged in the organism of the 
Volk, like a cell becomes part of a larger living organism. That a 
racially alient element had no place in this organic body goes with-
out saying. The maintenance of racial purity, which was necessary 
to insure the growth of a healthy and vigorous Volk, became thus 
one of the tasks of the Party. 
But a growing Volk expands and expansion must mean contact 
with racially inferior peoples, i. e., a struggle for living space and 
raw materials in the East. At this point in Hitler's ideology every-
thing fell into place: Marxism was seen as a threat to the voelkische 
community because it respected neither political nor ethnic bounda-
ries. 8 It was furthermore an invention and a tool of that "ferment 
of decomposition," the Jew, whose sole aim was to subjugate the 
Aryan peoples of the world for his own profiteering ends. The 
motives for the Jew's actions, however, ran even deeper: "In the 
last resort it is the Aryan alone who can form states and set them 
on their path to future greatness. All this the Jew cannot do; there-
fore his revolutions must be international . . . and with his 
envious instinct for destruction he seeks to disintegrate the national 
spirit of the Germans and pollute their blood." 9 The struggle 
against Marxism and the extermination of the Jews, whom Hitler 
considered to be the ''biological basis of Bolshevism," 10 became 
interwoven with the struggle for living space and protection of the 
"Aryan peoples" against a weakening of their racially based strength. 
The eventual struggle between these two W eltanschauungen, 
National Socialism and Marxism, needed to be translated into 
reality: "Therefore an instrument must be created for the voelkische 
W eltanschauung, which enables it to fight, just as the Marxist party 
organization creates a free path for internationalism." 11 The Pro-
6. Speech by Adolf Hitler on October 7, 1933 at Bueckeburg, cited in Alan Bullock, 
Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (compl. rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), 
p. 401. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Bullock, Hitler, p. 406. 
9. Speech by Adolf Hitler on July 28, 1922, ibid., p. 407. 
10. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 498. 
11. Ibid., p. 423. 
vi 
gram of the National Socialist German Worker's Party proposed in 
Point 22 the creation of a People's Army.12 This idea, however, 
never materialized because of the opposition of the Reischswehr. 
Consequently, Hitler, after becoming Chancellor of the Weimar 
Republic in 1933 through various manipulations of commanders, 
sought to gain control of the Reichswehr, the strongest non-political 
institution in the state. After 1941 he intensified his attempts to 
make the Wehrmacht the tool of National Socialist ideology. It is 
the purpose of this study to trace Hitler's evolving program of 
using the military to accomplish his political ends. 
12. Das Programm der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei cited in Dr. 
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Dr. Werner Jochmann, (eds.), Ausgewaehlte Dokumente zur 
Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1933-1945 (Bielefeld: Neue Gesellschaft G. m. b. H., 
1961), n.p. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Military Establishment and National 
Socialist Ideology 
The former President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, 
Hermann Rauschning, once pointed out Adolf Hitler's lack of in-
terest in the details of a problem unless it concerned the Army or 
foreign policy.1 Considering the prominent position of the military 
establishment in recent German history, Hitler's concern with mili-
tary matters would in itself not seem to be out of the ordinary. His 
front-line experience as a common soldier in the First World War, 
which seems to have been the most formative experience of his life,2 
together with his pseudo-Darwinian views of the preeminence of 
struggle in the life of a nation, 3 may serve to explain in part his 
almost obsessive preoccupation with things military. His activities 
as an "Educational Officer" in the immediate postwar period not 
only helped him maintain his ties with the Army but also contrib-
uted greatly to his extremely negative attitude towards the Weimar 
Republic and all it stood for. 4 
The picture of the German Army of the First World War as it 
emerges from the pages of Mein Kampf stresses the Army's role as 
a bulwark against the evils of parliamentarianism and materialism. 
The Army is shown as the preserver of the ideals of devoted service 
to the country and of the individual's sacrifice for the general wel-
fare of the people. 5 "What many Germans . did not wish 
to see, the alien world around them recognized: The German Army 
was the most powerful weapon in the service of the freedom of the 
German nation and in the support of the nation's children." 6 The 
Army of the future, so Hitler argued, must preserve these traditional 
values; in addition it must act as a unifying factor in overcoming 
regional sentiments and loyalties.7 The Army was also to remain 
1. Hermann Rauschning, Hitler Speaks: A Series of Political Conversations With Adolf 
Hitler on His R eal A ims. (London: Thornton and Butterworth Ltd., 1940), p. 183. 
2. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Muenchen: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Franz Eber 
Nachf., 1944), p. 225. 
3. Speech by Adolf Hitler on March 15, 1929, cited in Dr. Otto Ernst Schueddekopf, 
Das Heer und die Republik: Quellen zur Politik der Reichswehrfuehrung 1918-1988 
( Hannover: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt 0. Goedel, 1955), p. 281. 
4. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 235. 
5. Ibid., p. 307. 
6. Ibid., p. 308. 
7. Ibid., p. 647. 
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the "school of the nation" in the coming order, but its educational 
role was to be considerably widened. In his discussion of the 
voelkische state, Hitler emphasized that one of the tasks of this type 
of education was to create in the individual the desire to preserve 
his racial purity. The completion of the educational process in the 
voelkische state culminates in the military service which "must be 
regarded as the conclusion of the average German's normal educa-
tion." 8 Although Hitler's ideas concerning the nature and role of 
the Army in the new state were in 1924 by necessity very general, 
they contain the basic elements of his later thoughts and actions: 
creation of an essentially political, i.e., National Socialist oriented 
Army which, highly centralized and possessed by a spirit of loyalty 
and devotion as it had existed in the trenches of the First World 
War, would serve as an important factor in the life of the National 
Socialist state. 
These basic ideas were developed further in a speech by Hitler 
in 1929 in which he declared: "Reichswehr or militia, people's army 
or standing army or whatever, is for us National Socialists only a 
means to an end. Our criterion will forever be: is it useful to our 
Volk? Because the Volk is to us a higher concept than the concept 
of the state. It is conceivable that a state is rotting and decaying 
and that the Volk must destroy such a state because its very life 
demands it." 9 At the same occasion Hitler condemned the Reichs-
wehr, s principle of U eberparteilichkeit 10 and declared it to be the 
mission of the Army to "exterminate the vermin of party politics." 
He compared the national defense policy of the Social Democratic 
Party ( SPD) with the policy of his own movement and stated that 
his party, if victorious, would make every effort to create military 
formations outlawed by the treaty of Versailles. The most signifi-
cant statement of the speech, in the light of future developments, 
was Hitler's definition of the relationship between the Army and 
politics: "To the extent that the political leadership is lacking an 
understanding of military leadership, to that extent the military 
itself must become the carrier of a political ideology." 11 
The creation of a new class of leaders to replace the ruling class 
of the past was discussed by Hitler in the summer of 1932 at the 
8. Ibid., p. 476. 
9. Speech by Adolf Hitler on March 15, 1929, cited in Schueddekopf, Das Heer und 
die Republik, p. 281. 
10. The term Ueberparteilichkeit denotes the policy of the Reichsweh1' to keep above 
politics. This policy goes back to an order by Colonel General Hans von Seeckt, Chief of 
the Army Command of the Reichswehr, which was issued following the Kapp Putsch of 
March, 1920. See Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 386. 
11. Speech by Adolf Hitler on March 15, 1929, cited in Schueddekopf, Das Heer und 
die Republik, pp, 283, 286. 
Brown House, the headquarters of the National Socialist Party in 
Munich. Speaking to a small circle of party comrades, Hitler 
explained: "The selection of the new Fuehrer class is my struggle 
for power. Whoever proclaims his allegiance to me is by this very 
proclamation and by the manner in which it is made one of the 
chosen. This is the great revolutionary significance of our long, 
dogged struggle for power that in it will be born a new Herren-class 
chosen to guide the fortunes not only of the German people, but of 
the world." 12 That the leaders of the Army as well as the leaders 
of the important organs of the state would have to be included in 
this new Fuehrer class seems obvious. The cleavage between the 
Reichswehr's concept of "splendid isolation from politics" 13 and 
these new concepts was to become increasingly apparent in the 
months following Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship of the 
German Reich on January 30, 1933. 
As Chancellor, Hitler was at last in an official position from 
which to influence the policies directly affecting the military estab-
lishment. His new position, however, also put him on the horns of 
a dilemma. The existence of large, armed formations of Sturm-
abteilungen (SA) 14 under their aggressive Chief of Staff, Captain 
Ernst Roehm, had to be reconciled with the existence of the Reichs-
wehr as the traditionally sole military establishment. On February 3, 
1933, Hitler addressed the Commanders of the Army and the Navy 
at the occasion of the appointment of the new Reich Defense 
Minister, Major General Werner Eduard Fritz von Blomberg. 
Hitler emphasized that the Reichswehr was to remain the sole arms 
bearer in Germany and that an amalgamation of Party and Army 
formations on the Italian example was out of the question.15 Hitler's 
attitude seems to have been gratefully appreciated by the leaders 
of the Armed Forces, especially by von Blomberg and the new Chief 
of the Ministeramt in the Defense Ministry, Colonel Walther von 
Reichenau.16 The relationship between the Armed Forces and the 
SA was also the subject of Hitler's speech in Bad Godesberg on 
August 19, 1933, when he pointed out that the relationship of the 
12. Rauscbning, Hitler Speaks, p. 49. 
13. Walter Goerlitz, "Wallensteins Lager 1920-1938: Das Verhaeltnis der deutschen 
Generalitaet zur Republik und zum Nationalsozialismus," Frankfurter Hefte, No. 5 (May, 
1948), 416. 
14. The Sturmabteilungen (SA) or Storm Troopers were an irregular National Socialist 
Militia. 
15. Speech by Adolf Hitler on February 3, 1933, at Berlin to the Commanders of the 
Army and Navy cited in Max Domarus, (ed.), Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932-
1945, Vol. I: Triumph (2 vols.; Muenchen: Sueddeutscher Verlag, 1965), 198. 
16. Ibid., pp. 197-198, n. 68. The Ministeramt was the office of the Defense Minister 
within the Ministry of Defense. Colonel Walther von Reichenau had been Chief of Staff to 
von Blomberg in Koenigsberg, East Prussia. Colonel von Reichenau is generally described 
as an ardent National Socialist. See Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi 
Party 1933-1939 (New York: James H. Heineman, Inc., 1966), p. 30. 
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SA to the Army was the same as the relationship between the 
political leadership and the Army. Both institutions were not to be 
regarded as a purpose in themselves but were to serve only one 
purpose, the preservation of the V olk.11 
The continuing conflict betwen Roehm' s intentions to make the 
SA the truly revolutionary army of the movement 18 on one hand 
and the Reichswehr' s insistence on its position as the sole bearer of 
arms in the nation on the other hand began to force Hitler into a 
position even more favorable to the Army. In a speech to the 
generals of the Reichswehr on February 28, 1934, Hitler not only 
confirmed the Reichswehr' s desired position but relegated the SA 
to political tasks in the interior of the country.19 Roehm fully 
recognized the implications of this shift in Hitler's attitude towards 
the SA and accused Hitler of betraying the revolution. 20 
Among the reasons for Hitler's siding with the Reichswehr was 
the necessity of keeping his obligation to the Reich President Field 
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as well as his desire to keep on good 
terms with the Reichswehr.21 Aside from the fact that he was 
hardly in a position to quarrel with his new and still powerful 
friends in the Defense Ministry, Hitler realized that the future 
belonged to an army of professionals. "But the best of these pro-
fessional troops cannot be selected on the basis of their revolution-
ary feelings or their status in the party, but solely on their technical 
qualifications. I can't seriously be expected to draw the material for 
my military elite from the bow-legged and knock-kneed SA." 22 The 
former revolutionary, Hitler, who had now become Adolf Legalite, 
had to rid himself of the army of street brawlers and terrorists which 
had become an organization without a function now that its erst-
while leader had become legitimate. 
The probability of the Reich President's impending death pro-
vided an impetus for a series of events which culminated in the 
disappearance of the SA as an organization of military significance. 
17. Speech by Adolf Hitler to the SA and SS L eadership Conference at Bad Godesberg 
on August 19, 1933, cited in Domarus, Hitler, I, 293. 
18. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army, ed. Gordon A. Craig (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), p. 192; Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power, 
trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Miffiin Co., 1944), p. 746. 
19. Speech by Adolf Hitler to the Generals of the Reichswehr on February 28, 1934, 
cited in Domarus, Hitler, I, 368. 
20. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks, pp. 154-155. Roehm expressed his disappointment with 
Hitler: "Adolf is a swine. He will give us all away. H e only associates with the reaction-
aries now. His old friends aren't good enough for him. Getting matey with the East 
Prussian generals. . . . Are we revolutionaries or aren't w e? . . • I'm the 
nucleus of the new army, don't you see that? Don't you understand that what's coming 
must be new, fresh and unused? The basis must be revolutionary. You can' t inflate it 
afterwards. . . . But Hitler puts me off with fair words." 
21. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny ( comp!. rev. ed.; N ew York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 268; Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, p. 475. 
22. Rauschning, Hitler Speaks, p. 185. 
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At a meeting in Bad Nauheim on May 16, 1934, the senior officers 
of the Ministry of Defense and the Inspectorates of the Army de-
cided to accept Hitler as successor to the Reich President after 
von Blomberg told them of an understanding he had reached with 
Hitler. According to this understanding, Hitler had promised to 
eliminate the SA in return for the Presidency.23 The exact nature 
of this agreement and the circumstances surrounding it seem to be 
the matter of some controversy. Alan Bullock, one of Hitler's 
biographers, believes that Hitler came to an agreement with the 
Reichswehr leaders on that matter during his stay on the cruiser 
Deutschland in April, 1934. 24 Some German historians, however, 
claim that sufficient evidence for the existence of such an agreement 
between Hitler and the Reichswehr generals is lacking.25 Whatever 
the exact nature of that agreement may have been, the Chief of Staff 
of the SA and other inconvenient opponents of Hitler's recent poli-
cies did find an inglorious end in the Blood Purge of June 30, 1934.26 
It has been pointed out that the Reichswehr played the role of a 
pretorian guard during the events of June 30, 1934.27 Although 
Hitler was soon to destroy such pretensions, there were no advanced 
indications of this in 1934. Years later, Field Marshal von Blomberg 
testified at the Nuremberg Trials that the generals considered much 
of what Hitler said as just so much propaganda that need not be 
taken seriously.2 "The personal oath to Hitler [and] the appearance 
of the W ehrmacht at the Nuremberg Party Congress in September 
[1934], seemed a modest enough price for the apparent restoration 
of the military monopoly and the apparent institutional sovereignty 
that went with it." 29 
The complete satisfaction of the Reichswehr with the outcome of 
the purge was summed up in von Blomberg's Order of the Day of 
July 1, 1934: "The Fuehrer has personally attacked and destroyed 
the traitors and mutineers with exemplary courage and soldierly 
decisiveness. The W ehrmacht as the arms bearer of the entire Volk, 
aloof from political conflict, will again pledge devotion and fidelity. 
Aware of the common ideals, the W ehrmacht will joyfully cultivate 
23. John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 
1918-1945 (2d ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), p. 313. 
24. Bullock, Hitler, p. 290. 
25. H erman Mau and H elmut Krausnick, Deutsche Geschichte der juengsten V ergangen-
heit 1933-1945 (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag H ermann Leins; Stuttgart: J. B. 
Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964), p. 62. 
26. Bullock, Hitler, p. 303. 
27. Michael Freund, Deutschland unterm Hakenkreuz: Die Geschichte der Jahre 1933-
1945 ( Guetersloh : C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1965), p. 63. 
28. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the Inter-
national Military Tribunal, XL ( 42 vols.; Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 
1949 ), 406. (Hereafter cited as IMT.) 
29. David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 
1933-1939 (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), p. 207. 
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cordial relations with the new SA." 30 Even the Reich President felt 
that he had to congratulate the Prussian Minister President and now 
General of the Infantry, Hermann Goering, on his success in "defeat-
ing the attempt to commit treason." 31 The rewards for the Reichs-
wehr' s silence of complicity were soon to come. In his Reichstag 
Speech of July 13, 1934, Hitler reminded the Reichswehr that he 
had argued for fourteen years that the fighting organizations of the 
Party had nothing to do with the Army, that he had clearly stood 
by his original position and that "there is only one bearer of the 
arms in the state: the W ehrmacht. And there is only one source of 
the political will: the National Socialist Party." 32 
The entire affair of mutual reassurances of trust and devotion 
was not without overtures from the Army. On the day before the 
purge of the SA, von Blomberg had elaborated on the position of the 
W ehrmacht in the Third Reich in an article in the official Party 
organ, the V oelkischer Beobachter. He explained that the Army 
would serve the new state and its leadership from deepest convic-
tion and assured his readers of the loyalty of the Army to the 
President and to the Fuehrer, "who once came from our ranks and 
will always remain one of us." 33 
At the time of the death of the Reich President on August 2, 1934, 
the small number of opponents to Hitler's presidential ambitions 
were divided among themselves and without influence on the course 
of events.34 Hitler's Cabinet had acted with speed, and on the 
night before the President's death, it had decreed the "Law Con-
cerning the Head of State of the German Reich" which unified the 
office of Reich President with that of the Chancellor. The law was 
to become effective at the moment of the old President's death. 35 
This act allowed Hitler to unite in his person the offices of President 
of the Reich, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Chancellor 
of the Reich, and Fuehrer of the National Socialist Party. This 
is not to say, however, that Hitler was now in full command 
of the Armed Forces. Technically all orders of the President con-
cerning the military establishment had to be countersigned by 
either the Chancellor or, as was customary, the Defense Minister.36 
30. Decree of July 1, 1934, by the Reich Defense Minister, cited in Domarus, Hitler, 1, 
405. 
31. Telegram from the Reich President to Hermann Goering, date July 2, 1934, cited in 
ibid. 
32. Speech by Adolf Hitler to the German Reichstag on July 13, 1934, cited in ibid., 
p. 417. 
33. Voelkischer Beobachter, June 29, 1934, ibid., 393. 
34. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, p. 331. 
35. "Law Concerning the Head of State of the German Reich" of August 1, 1934, 
cited in Domarus, Hitler, I, 429. 
36. Friedrich Hossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934-1938 (2d ed. rev.; 
Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), p. 54. 
With the compliant von Blomberg heading the Defense Ministry 
there would have been no obstacle to Hitler's exercise of full control 
over the Armed Forces, but Hitler appears to have been aware of 
the fact that von Blomberg was not representative of the entire 
Army leadership. Never one to force things at an inopportune 
moment, Hitler wisely kept himself in the background and, for 
the time being, appears to have been content to exercise his powers 
as Supreme Commander only nominally.87 
The significance of the fusion of the office of Reich President 
with that of Reich Chancellor lay in the fact that it opened the way 
to one-man rule. It had enabled Hitler to become Supreme Com-
mander of the Armed Forces in a quasi-legitimate fashion.88 This 
fact was duly emphasized by von Blomberg's order of August 2, 
1934, to the troops to take a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler.89 
The text of this fateful oath deviated from the wording of the past 
oath in that it established a personal tie of loyalty between the 
officers and men of the W ehrmacht and Hitler rather than a pledge 
of loyalty to the country or the government.40 Hitler's reply to what 
appears to have been a voluntary action on von Blomberg's part 
made the meaning of the oath even clearer, and, whether intention-
ally or not, reminded the Army leaders that an old bargain had 
been fulfilled. "Just as the officers and soldiers of the W ehrmacht 
have pledged themselves to the new state in my person, so will I at 
all times regard it as my highest duty to intercede in behalf of the 
stability and inviolability of the W ehrmacht in accordance 
with my own desire to fix ( verankern) the army as the sole bearer 
of arms ( einziger W aff entraeger) in the nation." 41 
Although Hitler abstained from direct interference in internal 
Army matters for the time being, he began to consolidate his posi-
tion as Supreme Commander through a series of legislative acts. 
The W ehrgesetz of May 21, 1935, gave to the Reich War Minister 
the additional title of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces 
and to Hitler the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. 
The law provided that the Reich War Minister exercise his func-
37. Ibid., p. 64. 
38. Michael Freund argues that the appoinbnent of Hitler was in direct violation of the 
Enabling Law which provided that the government could change the constitution but could 
not abolish the office of Reich President. Freund, Deutschland unterm Hakenkreuz, p. 63. 
39. Rossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, p. 65. 
40. The text of the oath reads: "I swear by God this holy oath that I will render to 
Adolf Hitler, Leader of the German nation and people, Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces, unconditional obedience, and I am ready as a brave soldier to risk my life at any 
time for this oath." Cited in O'Neill, The German Anny and the Nazi Party, 1933-1939, 
p. 55. 
Freund argues that the oath was invalid because the Cabinet legalized it after the 
soldiers had taken it. In addition, the soldiers were already under oath to the constitution. 
Freund, Deutschland unterm Hakenkreuz, p. 71. 
41. Letter by Hitler to von Blomberg, date August 20, 1934, cited in Craig, The 
Politics of the Prussian Army, p. 480. 
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tions under the direction of the Supreme Commander and contained 
no provision that orders by the Supreme Commander required 
the countersignature of either the War Minister or the Chancellor.42 
While the leadership of the Armed Forces were kept busy imple-
menting the new laws regulating conscription and military, service,43 
Hitler made plain to the nation at large and to those in the Armed 
Forces who wanted to know what were the legal technicalities of 
the new W ehrgesetz and the new oath. "The two pillars of the new 
Reich may keep in mind that only acting as one can they fulfill their 
tasks. The Party gives the Army to the Volk, and the Volk gives 
the soldiers to the Army; both jointly give to the German Reich the 
security of inner peace and the strength for maintaining its posi-
tion." 44 
On the newly established "Day of the W ehrmacht," Hitler drew 
a line of distinction between the old Reichswehr and the new 
W ehrmacht. In his "Speech to the Soldiers" he referred to the 
assembled troops as the "new soldiers of the new German Reich." 45 
A few weeks later the new soldiers were told in the Order of the 
Day of November 7, 1935, that the swastika which now decorated 
the new war flag should be to them "the symbol of unity and purity 
of the nation, signifying the strength of the National Socialist 
W eltanschauung." 46 There were neither protests nor actions by 
the leaders of the Armed Forces against this continuing injection 
of political slogans, symbols, and ideas into the military system. 
Any opposition of Army leaders against the regime would have 
been opposition against the legitimately constituted authority of the 
state to which officers and men were bound by a personal oath of 
loyalty. 
A series of internal events, such as the Fritsch Crisis, brought in 
their wake a further drastic change in the relationship between 
Hitler and the Army. The chain of intrigues, scandals, and accusa-
tions affected the entire higher command structure of the Armed 
Forces and found its final expression in Hitler's "Decree Concerning 
the Leadership of the Armed Forces" in which Hitler announced 
that he would now exercise the power of command over the Armed 
Forces "directly and personally." The Decree also announced the 
42. Weh1'gesetz, May 21 1935, cited in Dr. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Dr. Werner 
Jocbmann (eds.), Ausgewaehlte Dokumente ZU1' Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1933-
1945 (Bielefeld: Neue Gesellschaft G. m. b. H., 1961 ), n. p. The Weh1'gesetz designated 
von Blomberg as Reich War Minister rather than Reich Defense Minister. 
43. Conscription had been introduced by the Gesetz fue1' den Aufbau der W eh1'macht 
of March 16, 1935, ibid., n. p. 
44. "Final Speech" by Hitler to the Party Congress at Nuremberg in September, 1935, 
cited in Domarus, Hitle1', I, 541. 
45. "Speech to the Soldiers" by Hitler on September 16, 1935, at Nuremberg, ibid., 
539. 
46. Order of the Day of November 7, 1935, by Hitler, ibid., 549. 
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creation of a High Command of the Armed Forces ( Oberkommando 
der W ehrmacht or OKW) which was to operate directly under 
Hitler's command as his military staH.47 At the same time, Colonel 
General Baron Werner Thomas Ludwig von Fritsch and Field Mar-
shal Werner von Blomberg received Hitler's letters of appreciation 
for past services in which the Fuehrer expressed his desire that their 
health might soon improve.48 In rapid succession, on the same day, 
a series of military appointments was announced, the most impor-
tant of which made Colonel General Herman Goering a Field 
Marshal, General Walther von Brauchitsch Commander in Chief of 
the Army, and General Wilhelm Keitel Chief of the High Command 
of the Armed Forces.49 
47. Erlass ueber die Fuehrung der Wehrmacht of February 4, 1938, by Hitler, cited in 
Domarus, Hitler, I , 782. 
48. Letters by Hitler to von Blomberg and von Fritsch, date February 4, 1938, ibid., 
783. Von Fritsch was relieved of his duties as Commander in Chief of the Army because 
of his supposed involvement with a homosexual ex-convict. Von Blomberg was relieved of 
his duties because of his marriage to a lady with a questionable background. See Wheeler-
Bennett, The N emesis of Power, p. 367. 
49. Letter of appointment of Wilhelm Keitel by Hitler, date February 4, 1938, cited 




Military Tradition in the Inter-War Period 
"It was a point of honor with the Prussian officer to be correct, it 
is a duty of the German officer to be crafty." 1 This statement by 
von Blomberg expressed not only the tragic deterioration of the 
traditional concept of honor but also characterized very well the 
narrow class outlook of that older generation of officers whose 
prime concern in their relationship with the state was to serve the 
interests of the Army. Craftiness, however, was not the answer to 
the problems which confronted the senior officers after 1933. 
To some extent these problems had been caused by the numerical 
increase of officers in the new W ehrmacht. Whereas the old 
100,000-man Reichswehr had listed 4,000 officers, the Army in 1939 
listed a total of 24,000 officers. 2 The older generation of officers 
viewed the new arrivals with a great deal of misgiving and suspi-
cion. 3 They were, after all, not the product of von Seeckt' s school of 
thought 4 but, in many cases, the products of previous schooling in 
the Hitler Youth, the SA, or the Reich Labor Service.5 The older 
officers had seen the purpose of the 100,000-man Army as a vessel 
in which to transmit the traditional values of the soldier's profession 
and had favored an organic growth based on these values. The 
newcomers had little or no understanding of these values and were 
much more impressed with the modern and aggressive spirit of the 
National Socialist movement.6 To what extent the former members 
of the Free Corps found a place in the new Army has not been 
established. Their contribution to the Army seems to have been 
indirect: many of them rose to positions of power in the National 
Socialist state from where they were able to pass on to the new 
generation their "brutality of spirit and exaltation of power." 7 
Aside from the numerical increase and the resulting inability of 
the senior officers to weld the Corps into a homogeneous and cohe-
1. Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg quoted in Hermann Rauscbning, The R evolution 
of Nihilism: Warning to the West (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1939), p. 123. 
2. Hermann Foertsch, Schuld und V erhaengnis: Die Fritsch-Krise im Fruehfahr 1938 als 
W endepunkt in der Ge chichte der nationalsozialistischen Z eit ( Stuttgart: Deutsche Ver-
lagsanstalt, 1951), p. 106. 
3. Peter Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1950), p. 106. 
4. See Chapter I , n. 10. 
5. Foertsch, Schuld und V erhaengnis, p. 181. 
6. Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder, p. 107. 
7. Robert G. Waite, Van~uard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movem ent in Post War 
Germany 1918-1923 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 281. 
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sive unit, 8 another and much more profound problem confronted 
the older generation. The traditional concept of honor in the 
Prussian Army had always been tied to the monarch.9 But with the 
disappearance of the monarchy, a void was created. "In the absence 
of spiritual directives," a former Prussian officer wrote in 1939, "from 
which the officers are suffering at the moment, with their two ele-
ments of guidance, the Crown and the Christian Church taken 
from them, they are reduced to spiritual Ersatz, cheap substitutes 
of doubtful origin and efficacy." 10 While the experience of the First 
World War had already contributed to a heightening of the moral 
value of absolute obedience,11 this process not only continued but 
was considerably strengthened during the Seeckt era.12 In 1923 
von Seeckt declared: "A soldier's honor does not lie in knowing 
better or having better ideas, but in obeying." 13 The disastrous 
consequences of this attitude became clear at Nuremberg in 1945 
when General Colonel Alfred Jodl said: "I have been an obedient 
soldier and I saw my honor in keeping that obedience which I had 
sworn. . . I have in these five years worked and I have re-
mained silent, although I often held a different opinion, and recog-
nized that impossible nonsense which I was ordered to perform." 14 
As absolute obedience became a moral absolute, and as such the 
basis of an officer's honor, the oath of loyalty now sworn to the 
person of the Fuehrer was soon to create a dilemma which many 
of the older officers were unable to resolve. Some attempted to 
resign, others took Hight into professionalism and talked about the 
traditional Ueberparteilichkeit of the Army, but the overwhelming 
majority thought that they had to continue to serve the state. After 
the end of the Second World War, von Blomberg reflected: "I have 
never been aware of an action or an opposition of the generals 
against Hitler and his National Socialist Program. Through his 
program of rearmament he brought the generals the fulfillment of 
old desires. During my ministry Hitler attempted to stand by the 
traditions of the soldiers in every respect. If so many generals now 
deny their attitudes towards Hitler during these years, memory 
must have played a trick on them." 15 
8. Rauscbning, Revolution of Nihilism, p. 152. 
9. Karl Demeter, Das Deutsche O{fizierkorps in Gesellsschaft und Staat 1650-1945 ( 4th 
ed. rev. and expanded; Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fuer Wehrwesen, 
1965), p. 151. 
10. Rauschning, Revolution of Nihilism, p. 152. 
11. Demeter, Das Deutsche O{fizierskorps, p. 147. 
12. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army, ed. Gordon A. Craig (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), p. 167. 
13. Demeter, Das Deutsche Offizierskorps, p. 148. 
14. Ibid., p. 151. 
15. Foertsch, Schuld und Verhaengnis, p. 182. 
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The lack of concern over the political ideology of the Nazi move-
ment and the narrow class interests of the older members of the 
corps of officers were to a great degree the result of the Corps' 
traditional relationship in the state. Like the concept of honor, the 
relationship of the officers to the state had traditionally been charac-
terized by the link between monarch and officer. As such the Corps' 
responsibility lay neither with the people nor with the state but 
rather with its source of existence, the crown.16 Under the Weimar 
Republic and von Seeckt's guidance, the majority of officers felt 
little allegiance to either the Republic or the Constitution.17 Their 
allegiance lay rather with a somewhat nebulous concept, a kind 
of "permanent state" which according to von Seeckt was repre-
sented by the Army.18 General Wilhelm Groener, Reichwehr-
minister from 1928 to 1932, defined the functions of the Army in 
1930 in these words: "It is the sacred task of the W ehrmacht to 
prevent the cleavage between classes and parties from ever widen-
ing into suicidal civil war. In all times of need . . . there is 
one unshakable rock in the stormy sea: the idea of the state. The 
W ehrmacht is its necessary and most characteristic expression. It 
has no other interest and no other task than service to the state. 
[The Wehrmacht] would falsify its essence and destroy 
itself if it descended into the party conflict and itself took party." 19 
Although U eberparteilichkeit served the nation well during times 
of crises, it also had serious drawbacks: not only was the Army 
"above parties," it also was above identifying itself with the Repub-
lic, with parliament, or with the Constitution. 20 In short, the Army 
existed outside the political reality of the Weimar Republic and 
attempted to function in a world of its own, guided by vague 
concepts of a by-gone era. 
Dr. Julius Leber ( SPD ), one of the parliamentary specialists on 
W ehrmacht questions, recognized this problem as early as 1931 
when he pointed out that obedience was not enough and that the 
soldier "must have a mental image of what his task consists of" and 
should recognize a set of ideals which he could follow.21 Many of 
the younger officers had already found such ideals in the new 
revolutionary movement of the National Socialists. Thus the real 
significance of the Ulm treason trials in 1930, involving Reichswehr 
officers with National Socialist leanings, was that they brought to 
16. Demeter, Das Deutsche Otfizierskorps, p. 182. 
17. Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 426. 
18. Ibid., pp. 388-389. 
19. Decree of the Reichswehr Ministry of January 22, 1930, cited in ibid., p. 433. 
20. Demeter, Das Deutsche Offizierkorps, p. 190. 
21. Ibid., p. 191. 
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the open for the first time that rift in the Corps of Officers which 
separated the old generation of officers from the young not only in 
terms of their background and previous service but, most important 
of all, in terms of the ideals to which they adhered. 22 General 
von Seeckt's thesis of the all-importance of discipline and obedience 
to authority had obviously proven to be insufficient motivation for 
the defendants and their sympathizers. The counsel for the defense 
at the Ulm treason trials asked the poignant question: "How is 
the soldier expected to sacrifice his life for people who say they 
know no fatherland called Germany?" He continued his argument 
adding that the soldier must put his country above the Constitution 
when the provisions of the Constitution are executed by traitors 
who are not cultivating a spirit of national defense.23 
Although it appears that this type of attitude was not confined 
to junior officers only, the extent to which general officers subscribed 
to it is difficult to determine. General Walther Reinhardt observed 
that two thirds of the young Reichswehr officers realized, as he did, 
that there was a pressing need for new ideals in the Army because 
whatever the Republic had to offer in that respect was meaningless 
to most of the officers. 24 General Hans Oster wrote in 1944 that 
most of the officers looked upon the events of 1933-1934 as a return 
to earlier traditions and, for that reason alone, welcomed National 
Socialism. They did not understand, he added, what was meant by 
phrases like "synthesis of party and state"; what was foremost in 
their minds was the rebuilding of the Army into a truly patriotic 
instrument. 25 This attitude was apparently characteristic of a num-
ber of the senior officers. Their attitude towards the National 
Socialist state was primarily determined by their interests as a 
professional class rather than by sympathy for the entire National 
Socialist program. Their traditional aversion to politics and their 
exaggerated concept of loyalty and obedience were to prove invalu-
able assets for a political manipulator of Hitler's skill. 
The junior officers, however, who had gone through training in 
the Hitler Youth or the Reich Labor Service were to provide an 
22. The d efendants were Lieutenant Richard Scheringer and Lieutenant Hans Ludin. 
Their ultimate objective was to gain the support of the Officer Corps in the event of a Nazi 
Revolution. They were sentenced by the Supreme Court of the Reich at Leipzig on Octo-
ber 4, 1930, to eighteen months of fortress detention for conspiracy to commit high treason. 
See John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-
1945 (2d ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), pp. 214-220 passim. 
23. Dr. Sack, "Das Ringen fuer Blut und Ehre," Voelkischer Beobachter, October 10, 
1930, cited in Dr. Otto Ernst Schueddekopf, Das H eer und die R epublik: Quellen zur 
Politik der Reichswehrfuehrung 1918-1933 (Hanover: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt 0. 
Goedel, 1955), p. 269. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Demeter, Das Deutsche Oflizierskorps, pp. 326-327. 
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ever increasing percentage of Nazi sympathizers within the Armed 
Forces.26 Thus the German Officer Corps by 1938 was no longer 
a homogeneous unit as in the era of von Seeckt. Internally divided 
and lacking a truly unifying philosophy, the Corps presented a 
picture not unlike the Weimar Republic, which it so detested. 
26. Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party 1933-1939 (New York: 




The Rise of General Keitel and the OKW 
Wilhelm Keitel was born on September 22, 1882, in Helmsche-
rode, where he spent his early life at his father's farm. He attended 
secondary school at Goettingen and, during his senior year, toyed 
with the idea of taking a commission in the Field Artillery, simply 
because "they had horses." His father's second marriage prevented 
Keitel's return to the farm: financial problems and the size of the 
farm made it impossible to sustain two families.1 On March 7, 1901, 
he entered the Lower Saxon Field Artillery Regiment No. 42.2 In 
August, 1914, when World War I began, Keitel, now a Lieutenant 
with the Wolfenbuetteler Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the 
Belgian border with his troops.3 He served for a time as battery 
commander, was promoted to Captain, and in March, 1915, was 
assigned to a General Staff position with the X Reserve Corps.4 His 
letters to his wife and to his father during that period expressed his 
pride over the last appointment but also his inadequate preparation 
for the task. 5 
Like most other officers, he was shocked by the outbreak of the 
revolution in Germany in 1918: "Those of us who have known 
discipline and order as the symbols of a German soldier's virtue 
have had a terrible experience. . I think that we will be 
able to create a viable state through the National Assembly and 
that we shall be able to overcome gradually the consequences of 
the revolution and the wretched war. Both could have been avoided 
anyhow." 6 
After the war Keitel continued his service with the Reichswehr 
in various command positions. On February 1, 1925, he was trans-
ferred to General Staff Service in the Armed Forces Office, Depart-
1. Walter Goerlitz ( ed.), Generalfeldmanchall Keitel: V erbrecher oder Of]izier? Erin-
nerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW ( Goettingen: Musterscbmidt Verlag, 1961), 
p. 13. 
2. Ibid. , p. 14; Douglas M. Kelly, Prison Psychiatrist at Nuremberg, and G. M. Gilbert, 
Prison Psychologist at Nuremberg, respectively referred to Keitel as "a traditional Prussian 
gentleman" and the "chief representative of Prussian militarism." See Douglas M. Kelley, 
M. D., 22 Cells in Nuremberg (New York: MacFadden Publications, Inc., 1961 ), p. 94; 
G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: The New American Library of World Litera-
ture, Inc., 1961 ), p. 29. 
3. Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 19. 
4. Postcard from Wilhelm Keitel to his father, March 11, 1915, ibid., p. 29. 
5. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to bis father, July 13, 1915, ibid., p. 32. 
6. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to his father-in-law, D ecember 10, 1918, ibid., p. 36. 
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ment of Army Organization.7 Although his letters during that time 
were mostly concerned with his work, they contained some political 
sentiment: the writer blamed the Social Democratic Party for the 
financial restrictions under which the Reichswehr operated, 8 and, 
jealous of the prerogatives of the Army, he wrote of the "presump-
tuous attitude of the SA." 9 Taken as a whole, however, his cor-
respondence between the end of World War I and Hitler's chancel-
lorship gave no hint of any interest in the National Socialist move-
ment. The image of Keitel reflected in these letters was that of an 
extremely conscientious and hard-working bureaucrat.10 
In November, 1931, two years after he had become head of the 
Organizations Department in the Armed Forces Office, Keitel was 
promoted to Colonel.11 Between 1933 and 1934 he served as Infan-
try Commander in Potsdam. During that time he had several 
clashes with the local SA leader, Obergruppenfuehrer Otto Ernst, 
whom he suspected of meddling in Reichswehr affairs. After a 
short period of service in Bremen, he was appointed successor to 
General Walther von Reichenau, the head of the Armed Forces 
Office. In his memoirs Keitel emphasized that it was von Fritsch 
who suggested him for that position, ostensibly to show that von 
Fritsch considered him to be a traditional soldier in contrast to the 
well-known National Socialist Reichenau. Although Keitel said that 
he was happy as Divisional Commander in Bremen and that he 
wanted to have nothing to do with politics, he agreed to take the 
new position, "because I was a bit vain and it [the appointment] 
was an obvious recognition of my abilities and the confidence placed 
in me." In 1945 Keitel wrote that when Hitler came to power, he 
thought of him as being a good "drummer," i.e., a man who had 
been successful influencing the masses of the people. "After all 
. we were used to changes in the government," he said.12 
That he was not particularly bothered by some of the methods the 
Nazis used to come to power was not out of the ordinary for a 
member of his profession. 
It should also be noted that Hitler's program contained promises 
to the Reichswehr which no patriotic officer could afford to reject 
without being called a traitor to his class. Former Vice-Admiral 
Kurt Assma~ recalled later, "The officers viewed with genuine 
satisfaction Hitler's new program of freeing the Wehrmacht from 
7. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to his father, January 1, 1925, ibid., p. 39. 
8. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to his father, September 5, 1931, ibid., p. 47. 
9. Letter from Wilhelm Keitel to his father, August 28, 1932, ibid., p. 51. 
10. Letter from Lisa Keitel to father-in-law, January 23, 1926, ibid., p. 40. 
11. Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party 1933-1939 (New York: 
James H. Heineman, Inc., 1966), Appendix B, p. 193. 
12. "Memoirs 1933-1938," Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 58-80, 79, n. 84. 
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the fetters of the Treaty of Versailles and making it once again a 
power corresponding to the greatness of the Reich." If, from the 
viewpoint of a quarter century later, the officers' lack of resistance 
to Hitler was decried as default of character, one must also recall 
that the Reichswehr had for years been taught to follow von Seeckt's 
principle of U eberparteilichkeit as well as his idea that it was the 
function of the Army to provide the strongest support for the 
government in power.13 
The degree to which Keitel was an adherent of this kind of think-
ing was evident in his reflection on the Roehm Purge. He had been 
suspicious of the SA since his days at Potsdam and apparently 
believed, then and at Nuremberg, that Roehm intended to eliminate 
von Blomberg and von Fritsch. He regretted that General Kurt von 
Schleicher and Major General Kurt von Bredow had been murdered 
by an SA squad during the Roehm Purge; they should have been 
court-martialled, he said, because of their involvement in politics 
which were in opposition to the government in power. "General von 
Schleicher," Keitel wrote in 1945, "was unfortunately involved in 
this game; he was and remained the cat which could not resist 
catching political mice." 14 To Keitel the entire Roehm affair was 
simply a matter of the legitimate government maintaining itself 
against a band of revolutionaries. His position, like that of the 
Reichswehr, was clear: support the legitimate government against 
disorder. There is no evidence that ideological considerations 
played a role in Keitel' s position. 
The political and military development in the first five years of 
Hitler's chancellorship had little effect on the structure of the 
Armed Forces leadership. The ascendancy of the already existing 
High Command of the Armed Forces ( Oberkommando der Wehr-
macht or OKW) on February 4, 1938, to the position which it held-
at least in theory-until the end of the war was in part made possi-
ble by the dismissal of the Reich War Minister and Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces General Field Marshal von Blomberg. 
From now on [read the Fuehrer's decree of February 4, 1938], I exercise the 
immediate command over the whole armed forces. The former Wehrmacht 
Office in the War Ministry becomes the High Command of the Armed Forces 
[OKW], and comes immediately under my command as my military staff. At 
the head of the Staff of the High Command stands the former Chief of the 
Wehrmacht Office [Keitel]. He is accorded the rank equivalent to that of Reich 
Minister. The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the func-
tions of the War Ministry, and the Chief of the High Command exercises, as 
13. Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann, "Hitler and the German Officer Corps," trans. 
Captain Roland E. Krause. United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, LXXX (May, 
1956), 510. 
14. Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 70-71. 
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my deputy, the power hitherto held by the Reich War Minister. The task of 
preparing the unified defense of the Reich in all fields in accordance with my 
instructions is the function of the High Command in times of peace.15 
The ambiguous wording of the decree, which in one place defines 
the OKW as "my military staff'' but in another place assigns to it the 
role of the former War Ministry, raises the important question of 
how much independence of action the OKW was to possess and 
consequently to what degree it was to be responsible for orders 
issued in its name. In a conversation with the Chief of the Reich 
Chancellery, Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers, Hitler explained: "In 
the future I do not want a Reich War Minister nor do I want a 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces who stands between 
myself and the Commanders in Chief of the Services." 16 The text 
of the Fuehrer Decree as well as Keitel's later testimony at Nurem-
berg indicates that the position of Reich War Minister was in fact 
abolished.17 The administrative functions of the Ministry were 
from now on handled by the OKW, whereas the command functions 
connected with the office of Reich War Minister in the latter's 
capacity as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces were taken 
over by Hitler.18 
Although the decree of February 4, 1938, defined the function of 
the OKW as a military staff of the Supreme Commander, it did 
not define the function of the staff, i.e., it did not explain whether 
the OKW was to be an advisory body to the Supreme Commander 
or whether it was to be a type of General Staff of the Armed Forces. 
When Hitler was confronted with this question, he gave an evasive 
answer, saying that at the "appropriate time" he would see no 
obstacle to a General Staff of the Armed Forces.19 The possibility 
of creating an Armed Forces General Staff had in fact been a 
matter of some controversy among the leadership of the Armed 
Forces since 1933.20 
When von Blomberg decided in 1935 that his title "Reich Minister 
for War and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht" necessitated 
the creation of a High Command for the purpose of unifying the 
15. Erlass ueber die Fuehrung der W ehrmacht of February 4, 1938, by Hitler, cited in 
Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, Vol. I: Triumph ( 2 vols.; Muen-
chen: Sueddeutscher Verlag, 1965), 782. Beginning in February, 1934, the Ministeramt 
in the Defense Ministry was designated Wehrmachtamt or Armed Forces Office. In cases 
where this office r epresented the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces it used the title 
OKW. See Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-1945, trans. R. H. Barry 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 588. 
16. Testimony of Dr. Hans Heinrich Lammers on April 8, 1946, IMT, XI, 29. 
17. Deposition by Wilhelm Keitel on August 15, 1945, (Nelte File), cited in Goerlitz, 
Keitel, pp. 312-322. 
18. John W. Wheeler-Bennett's contention that Hitler assumed the functions of War 
Minister is misleading. See Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in 
Politics 1918-1945 (2d ed.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), p. 373. 
19. "Memoirs 1933-1938," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 113. 
20. O'Neill, The German Army, p. 108. 
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three branches of the Armed Forces along the lines of the Reich's 
centralized system of government, the Commanders in Chief of 
the Services, especially of the Army, soon expressed their opposition 
to his plans.21 As early as 1934 von Blomberg had begun to expand 
the M inisteramt in the Defense Ministry by adding an Operational 
Defense Staff. This development seemed to point towards a situa-
tion in which the Commanders in Chief of the Services not only 
would be removed to a lower level in the military hierarchy but 
would also have to give up part of their independent authority to 
von Blomberg's Ministeramt. The opponents in the struggle be-
tween the Armed Forces Office ( the former Ministeramt) and the 
General Staff of the Army were Major General Walther von Reiche-
nau and General Ludwig Beck respectively. After von Reichenau's 
transfer to the command of W ehrkreis VII, in August, 1935, Major 
General Keitel took his place. 22 
In August, 1937, von Fritsch presented von Blomberg with a 
lengthy memorandum in which he explained his views on the com-
mand structure of the Armed Forces. Although he recognized the 
need for a unified High Command of the Armed Forces, he rejected 
the notion that such an agency should be based upon the idea of 
equal importance of the three services. He argued that any 
organization of the High Command would have to consider the 
primacy of the Army in view of its greater numerical strength and 
its greater tactical significance in a European land war. It was for 
that reason unthinkable to him to interpolate an inter-service staff 
with coordinating functions between the Army High Command 
and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. His major 
objection to a creation of an Armed Forces High Command was 
that such an agency would tend to mushroom into a huge bureauc-
racy, thus removing the influence of Army commanders from the 
overall direction of the war effort. The solution von Fritsch offered 
in his memorandum was to leave the entire power of command 
with the Reich War Minister and Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces. To bring about the necessary coordination between 
the Services, von Fritsch simply suggested that the High Command 
of the Army be entrusted with planning and working out the pro-
posals for the overall conduct of the military operations. 23 This 
solution would have given the Army General Staff the decisive voice 
in the planning and conduct of war. Blomberg's proposed reorgani-
zation, on the other hand, tended to concentrate planning and 
21. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 7. 
22. O'Neill, The German Army, p. 108. 
23. Memorandum of Colonel General von Fritsch, "Wehrmachtspitzengliederung und 
Fuehrung der Wehrmacht im Kriege," August, 1937, cited in Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 123-144. 
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strategy at a level which was considerably closer to the political 
arena than the General Staff of the Army. 
According to Keitel, who maintained good personal relations with 
von Fritsch, 24 the Commander in Chief of the Army insisted that the 
Army remain "above politics," since he considered National Social-
ism a temporary political stage and secretly nurtured dreams of a 
restoration of the Hohenzollern monarchy; he had welcomed Hitler 
as Chancellor to destroy the parties of the Weimar Republic but 
rejected him as Head of State. 25 Von Blomberg, on the other hand, 
was of the opinion that the Armed Forces needed to accept the 
National Socialist ideology as the basis of the new state just as they 
had accepted the idea of the monarchy under the last emperor. 
"He [ von Blomberg] saw in National Socialism and the Fuehrer 
idea a type of elective monarchy instead of the inherited mon-
archy." 26 The difference of opinion between those favoring the 
eventual creation of an all-embracing Armed Forces General Staff 
and those favoring von Fritsch's solution appears to have created 
another division within the senior officers-"revolutionary Nazi up-
starts on one side and the Army traditionalists on the other," as 
one conservative observer put it after the war.27 
However, Hitler's assumption of direct command over the Armed 
Forces officially eliminated the intermediary level, meaning von 
Blomberg and his OKW. A High Command reappeared in its place 
but now as Hitler's military staff. The ambiguity of Hitler's position 
at the time made it difficult to tell whether this new OKW was to 
follow the course charted for it by von Blomberg or whether it had 
in fact become something entirely new. 
Shortly after the official announcement of the formation of the 
new OKW, Keitel prepared a Position Paper in which he outlined 
his concept of the higher organization of the W ehrmacht. He 
argued that the demands of the total war of the future necessitated 
a coordination of the nation's entire resources and potentialities 
with the purpose of incorporating them into the overall planning 
of the war. This total coordination, Keitel argued, could not pos-
sibly be handled by the Supreme Commander alone but must be 
administered by the OKW. He admitted that the Army could 
well be the decisive factor in a land war but added that the relative 
importance of the three Services was by no means fixed. Keitel 
appealed to the Services to consider themselvs a part of the entire 
24. "Memoirs 1933-1938," ibid., p. 86. 
25. lbi.d., pp. 86-87. 
26. Ibi.d. , p. 86. 
27. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 9. 
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armed force of the nation and to surrender a part of their traditional 
independence of action so that unity in organization as well as in 
leadership would be guaranteed. 28 
Keitel explained later that it had been his intention to separate 
the command functions from the administrative functions within 
the existing structure at the top level of the Armed Forces. The 
purpose of this separation would have been to provide the Com-
mander in Chief in his capacity as the highest ranking officer with 
an OKW and in his capacity as Reich War Minister with a type 
of ministerial office. Keitel envisioned his own position as that of 
the Minister's Secretary. 29 
Keitel's Position Paper of April 19, 1938, indicated that his think-
ing on the new OKW was guided solely by the desire to bring 
about a greater degree of efficiency in the organization of the 
Armed Forces. "It is contrary to the principles of total war of the 
future," he wrote, "to believe that the task of conducting the actual 
war, the coordination of economic and propaganda warfare, and 
the organization of the entire nation for the support of the war can 
be separated. They have to be very closely united, not only in the 
person of the Generalissimus [ Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces] who would only be a shadow leader like the emperor 
. but in a staff-the High Command of the Armed Forces." 30 
Keitel envisioned the organization of the Armed Forces leadership 
in times of war as follows: the political leadership and the leader-
ship of the nation as a whole to be the task of the Fuehrer; the 
conduct of the actual warfare, the coordination of propaganda and 
economic measures with the goals of military operations to be the 
task of the Generalissimus in accordance with directions received 
by the Fuehrer.31 
The contention that the "creation of the OKW under Keitel was 
a powerful means of transferring the strategic direction of German 
policy from the hands of the Army to those of Hitler, by default of 
character on the part of Keitel" 32 seems to ignore the fact that 
Keitel' s proposed organization clearly provided for a separation of 
the functions of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces from 
that of the Fuehrer. Keitel apparently did not realize at that time 
that Hitler never intended to fill the position of Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces and that Hitler's solution constituted an amal-
28. Position Paper by the Chief of the OKW, "Die Kriegsfuehrung als Problem der 
Organization," April 19, 1938, cited in Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 154-164. 
29. "Memoirs 1933-1938," ibid., p. 98. 
30. Position Paper by the Chief of the OKW, "Die Kriegsfuehrung als Problem der 
Organisation," April 19, 1938, ibid., p. 155. 
31. Ibid., p. 154. 
32. O'Neill, The German Army, p. 117. 
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gamation of the political and military leadership. All that remained 
of Keitel' s plan of organization was the hope that the unified com-
mand of three Services had been institutionalized in the OKW.33 
The circumstances surrounding Keitel's appointment as head of 
this ill-defined organization have been the subject of some dis-
agreement. It has been argued that Keitel had in fact worked 
towards achieving this position for himself. A closer examination of 
Keitel' s appointment, however, shows that he neither wanted the 
position nor knew what it entailed after he had accepted it. In fact, 
he does not seem to have become aware of the impending removal 
of von Blomberg until January 26, 1938. It was in the course of a 
conversation on that date that von Blomberg told Keitel to report 
to Hitler on that afternoon. At five o'clock Keitel presented himself 
to Hitler, whom he had personally never met before. Hitler indi-
cated to Keitel that he was deeply hurt by the entire Blomberg 
affair but that he had, nevertheless, given the new couple a trip 
around the world. He then brought up the question of a successor 
to von Blomberg; Keitel mentioned Hermann Goering. After Hitler 
rejected that proposal, Keitel suggested von Fritsch. At this point 
Hitler informed Keitel of the pending charges against the Colonel 
General. Shocked by the distressing news, Keitel continued to 
make suggestions: Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt was re-
jected because of his advanced age, General Walther von Brau-
chitsch was discussed but nothing was decided. Keitel was ordered 
to report again on the following day.34 
When Keitel met Hitler on January 27, Hitler seemed extremely 
upset. He informed Keitel of the latest developments in the Fritsch 
affair and fulminated against his adjutant, Colonel Friedrich Ross-
bach, who had informed Fritsch of the charges against him. When 
Keitel again suggested Goering as successor to von Blomberg, 
Hitler suddenly told him that he had decided to take personal 
command of the Armed Forces and that he had chosen him, Keitel, 
to be his Chief of Staff; Keitel agreed "without hesitation." 35 That 
the turbulent events of the last days of January must have greatly 
disturbed Keitel is shown in the entries in General Jodl's diary. 
After his first meeting with Hitler, Keitel came to Jodl "deeply 
shaken with tears in his eyes about the tremendous blow dealt to 
our joint task. I say to him: even if the man [Blomberg] should 
33. By June, 1938, the OKW consisted of four major departments: an Armed Forces 
Operations Office or W ehrmachtfuehrungsamt, a Foreign and Counter Intelligence Office or 
Amt Ausland/ Abwehr, a General Armed Forces Office or Amtsgruppe Allgemeine Wehr-
machtsangelegenheiten, and a Military Economics Group or Wirtscha~s und Ruestungsamt. 
See H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Blitzkrieg to Defeat: Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. xviii. 
34. Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 87, n. 117, 106-109. 
35. Ibid., p. 109. 
fall, his work must remain alive." The entries of January 27 indicate 
not only the type of emotional pressure which Hitler brought to 
bear on Keitel but also the very close identification which Keitel and 
Jodi felt with the organizational accomplishments of von Blomberg: 
"He [Hitler] says to Keitel, I am now relying on you, you must 
stay with me. You are my confidant and only adviser in military 
questions. The unified leadership is sacrosanct and invoilable 
to me. . . . General Keitel says to me: the unity of the 
W ehrmacht is secured." During that conversation Hitler also com-
plained to Keitel about his growing loneliness and his disappoint-
ments. Jodi concluded his observations of the meeting that day 
with the comment: "It was a tragic and deeply shocking moment 
. but all shadows are overcome by the certainty: the work 
of the First Fieldmarshal of the Third Reich, the unity of the 
W ehrmacht and its leadership, lives and if a kind fate stays with us 
won't be destroyed again." 36 From his jail cell in Nuremberg in 
1946, Keitel wrote about the events of January, 1938, saying that 
he had had the time neither to reflect on the events during these 
hectic days nor to be aware of the type of "Trojan horse" with which 
he had burdened himself.37 
The answer to the question why Keitel accepted the position of 
Chief of Staff appears to be that he felt at the time that the impor-
tant thing was to maintain the unified command of the Armed 
Forces while at the same time he was quite obviously taken in by 
Hitler's emotional appeal. There is no evidence that Keitel agreed 
to Hitler's offer because he was a National Socialist or because he 
desired the position for selfish reasons. Eight years later Keitel 
wrote: "No man could foresee how inextricable my task would be 
and that I would one day become the object of Hitler's uninhibited 
dictatorship." 38 
Rather than becoming the ministerial secretary, Keitel thus found 
himself in a position which required qualifications which he, by 
his own admittance, did not possess. 39 "What they [Keitel and 
Jodi] obviously failed to realize was that, with Hitler's assumption 
of command over the W ehrmacht, the staff of OKW had lost the 
purely military character which it had hitherto preserved. . . . 
[It] became henceforth the 'working staff' or . . . military 
bureau of Hitler, the politician." 40 
36. General Colonel Jodl's official diary, entry of January 26, 1938, IMT, XXVIII, 
356-357; January 27, ibid., 358-359. 
37. "Memoirs 1933-1938," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 113. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid., p. 99. 
40. Warlimont, Inside Hitler'a Headquarters, p. 12. 
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That the OKW was hardly ever any more than a military bureau 
is now widely recognized.41 But at the time of the change in the 
structure of the Armed Forces leadership and indeed up to the end 
of the Trials before the International Military Tribunal, the opinion 
persisted that the OKW was an agency of considerably greater 
significance.42 Although Hitler had given Keitel assurances that 
he "would never take a decision affecting the W ehrmacht without 
first hearing the views of his Chief of Staff," 43 he made little effort 
to do so and gradually reduced Keitel to a position of head clerk in 
his military bureau.44 Just how sincere Hitler was in his promise to 
consult Keitel in important matters was demonstrated at the famous 
Berghof conference between Hitler and Chancellor Kurt von 
Schuschnigg on February 11, 1938. Keitel was ordered to the Berg-
hof without receiving a reason. Upon his arrival, Keitel was in-
formed that Hitler was going to have a talk with the Austrian 
Chancellor in order to clear up some difficulties between the two 
governments and that he wanted some generals present to "impress" 
Schuschnigg. The generals were not asked to participate in nor did 
they know the precise object of the conferences.45 During a pause 
in the afternoon session Schuschnigg left the conference room to 
consult with another Austrian official. When Hitler suddenly began 
to shout for Keitel, the General presented himself and asked for 
orders. Hitler merely grinned and replied: "There are no orders. 
I just wanted you here." 46 Keitel realized his function then, namely 
to play a part in Hitler's attempt to intimidate the Austrian Chan-
cellor. Neither in this instance nor in the case of Germany's march 
into Austria in March, 1938, was Keitel consulted. In the latter case 
he was ordered to prepare for possible military intervention two 
days before the beginning of the campaign.47 
Hitler's reasons for selecting Keitel as Chief of the OKW sheds 
some interesting light on his true intentions in relation to the OKW 
and Keitel's functions within that body. Field Marshal von Blom-
berg said at Nuremberg that he discussed the question of his suc-
cessor with Hitler during his last visit to the Chancellery. Von 
Blomberg was apparently hesitant to name a successor when Hitler 
41. Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitlef' als militae1'ische1' Fuehref': Erkenntnisse und Erfahrun-
gen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (2d ed. rev.; Frankfurt 
am Main: Athenaeum Verlag, 1965), p. 163. 
42. Appendix B of Indictment, Statement of Criminality of Groups and Organizations, 
IMT, I, 83-84. 
43. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 14. 
44. B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: William Morrow & 
Co., 1948), p. 88. 
45. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 117. 
46. Franz von Papen, Memoirs, trans. Brian Connell (London: Andre Deutsch, 1952), 
p. 417. 
47. "Memoirs, 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 178. 
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suddenly asked him for the name of "'that general who's been in 
your office up to now?' Von Blomberg replied: 'Oh, Keitel; there's 
no question of him; he's nothing but the man who runs my office.' 
Seizing on this straight away, Hitler said at once: 'That's exactly 
the man I'm looking for.' " 48 
Hitler knew little of the man he wanted to succeed von Blomberg. 
Considering the fact that Hitler apparently agreed to an unknown 
man as successor to the highest military post in the nation, an 
unkown man in whose political attitudes he was not interested and 
of whose other qualifications he had just received an estimate that 
he was hardly suitable for the position, it seems reasonable to say 
that Hitler looked upon Keitel as either a stop-gap appointment or 
a figurehead. His subsequent performance before Keitel seems to 
have been put on for the purpose of instilling confidence in Keitel 
and leading him to believe that he intended to carry through 
Blomberg's reforms. 
The significance of the events of February 4, 1938, can hardly 
be overestimated. The German public was never informed of the 
true reasons for the dismissals of von Blomberg and von Fritsch. 
An official communique mentioned only that certain changes in 
personnel had taken place.49 The Voelkischer Beobachter spoke 
at length about the significance of the events. It emphasized that 
the changes in personnel were not accidental but the "visible 
expression of an organized and planned development." The paper 
interpreted the changes in command by saying, "The process of 
amalmagation between Army and Party is taking now a clearer 
organizational form. It is becoming increasingly clear that the 
leadership principle of the National Socialist state in its political 
and military character goes back to a single military source of 
power." 50 Hermann Goering's promotion to General Field Marshal 
was seen as a symbolic act; "it represented the betrothal of the 
soldierly spirit of the National Socialist movement to its political 
will." 51 
At the same time, the Army paper W ehrmacht commented on the 
events of February 4 in a considerably less enthusiastic manner. 
This paper merely pointed out that the changes in the structure of 
the W ehrmacht leadership served to simplify the existing "organiza-
48. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 13; Affidavit by von Blomberg on 
February 16, 1946, IMT, XL, 407-408. 
49. Hermann Mau and Helmut Krausnick, Deutsche Geschichte der juengsten V ergan-
genheit 1933-1945 (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Herman Leins; Stuttgart: J. B. 
Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964 ), p . 62. 
50. Hermann Foertsch, Schuld und Verhaengnis: Die Fritsch-Krise im Fruehjahr 1938 
als W endepunkt in der Geschichte der N ationalsozialistischen Zeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlagsantalt, 1951 ), p. 109. 
51. Ibid., p. 110. 
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tional monstrosity" and mentioned Keitel as the first adviser of Hitler 
in questions relating to the unified preparation for defense. "There 
is no doubt," the paper said, "that next to the organizational simpli-
fication, the whole Wehrmatch is closer to Hitler. He is now, with-
out an intermediary agency, the Supreme Commander." 52 
The military leaders in their political nai:Vete saw in the events 
of February 4, 1938, little more than a solution to an organizational 
problem. The more astute political leaders, however, realized that 
the integration of the Armed Forces into the totality of the Third 
Reich was well on its way. These differences in interpretation are 
an indication of the ambiguity of Keitel's position. 
52. Ibid., pp. 111-112. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Traditional Soldier in the 
Totalitarian State 
In the course of the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany, the de-
fense counsel for Keitel, Dr. Otto Nelte, submitted a chart which 




SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE 
ARMED FORCES 
with the military staff. 
"HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES" 
( heading the staff) 
Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces 
Keitel. 
The base of the pyramid showed eleven different offices repre-
senting the various agencies of the High Command.1 In an affidavit 
submitted by the defense to the Tribunal, Keitel explained that the 
OKW was the highest administrative office for the Armed Forces 
but that for operational and strategic matters, the OKW maintained 
only a few offices such as the Armed Forces Leadership Staff and 
the Foreign and Counter Intelligence Office whose services were 
used by the three branches of the Armed Forces. On the other 
hand, the OKW used the specialized departments of the Services 
either to work out the details of plans which, in their rough outlines, 
had been suggested to them by Hitler through the OKW or to 
transmit plans and suggestions of the Services to Hitler. The prob-
lem with this arrangement, Keitel pointed out, was that the Services 
found ways to circumvent the OKW and to win Hitler's approval 
of proposals of which the OKW had no prior knowledge. Under 
these conditions it is not surprising that Keitel found it extremely 
difficult to maintain the authority of his office. Keitel further testi-
fied that because of conflicting demands by the three branches of 
the Services, he found himself in the unwelcome position of a 
1. Document Keitel-I (a), IMT, XL, 350-351. 
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mediator. A third factor complicating his position was Hitler's 
unwillingness to adhere to orderly procedures as well as his habit 
of spontaneous intervention in strategic and administrative matters.2 
Keitel's testimony at Nuremberg stood in sharp contrast to his 
rank of Generalfeldmarschall and Chief of the OKW: he could 
hardly be called Hitler's first adviser. One former member of the 
OKW went so far as saying that the entire OKW had "no ~uthority 
other than that which Hitler was occasionally willing to lend it." 3 
Other witnesses who were familiar with the situation within the 
OKW testified to the fact that Keitel's influence on the formulation 
of orders was insignificant and that his powers were extremely 
limited.4 But not everyone testified in this manner. In the testimony 
of Dr. Hans Bernd Gisevius, former Gestapo officer and wartime 
OSS ( Office of Strategic Services) collaborator, 5 Keitel was charac-
terized as one of the most influential men in the Third Reich and as 
a man who exerted great influence on the Armed Forces. However, 
this testimony was thoroughly discredited during the trial. 6 In 
substance, the Keitel affidavit seems to be correct. 
Perhaps because of the discrepancy between his high rank and 
his limited responsibilities, Keitel has fared poorly at the hands of 
historians. To Trevor-Roper he was a "compliant puppet," to Telford 
Taylor a "doormat," to Gordon Craig a "man of no character and 
thorough going admirer of Hitler," and to Wheeler-Bennett a man 
"of complete acquiescence and subservient adulation." 7 Judgments 
of this sort, however, are difficult to substantiate. 
Central to an understanding of Keitel' s actions is his concept of 
duty and loyalty, which was the product of a lifetime in military 
service. In spite of the fact that Hitler did not appoint a Generalissi-
mus and soon began to make a shambles of the kind of OKW for 
which Keitel had worked, the General stayed on. General Walter 
W arlimont observed that "he was honestly convinced that his 
appointment required him to identify himself with the wishes and 
2. Affidavit by Wilhelm Keitel of March 8, 1946, ibid., 355-361. 
3. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-1945, trans. by R. H. Barry 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 17. 
4. General Siegfried Westphal, The German Army in the West (London: Cassell and 
Company, Ltd., 1951 ), p. 46; Statement by Vice-Admiral L. Buerckner on June 28, 1946, 
IMT, XL, 417. 
5. Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the twenty-two de-
fendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1966 ), p. 69. 
6. Statement by Vice-Admiral L. Buerckner on June 28, 1946, IMT, XL, 417-418; 
Office of United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy 
and Aggression, Supplement B, Final Argument by Dr. Otto Nelte ( 8 vols. and 2 supple-
mentary vols. A and B; Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 242. 
7. H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1947), p. 122; Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western 
Europe, 1940 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 13; Gordon A. Craig, The 
Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 
p. 495; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 
1918-1945 (2d ed.; London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964), p. 429. 
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instructions of his Supreme Commander, even though he might 
not personally agree with them, and to represent them faithfully to 
all those involved." 8 Although Keitel's relations with Hitler prior 
to the war with the Soviet Union seem to have been relatively free 
of friction, there were several incidents which indicated that Keitel 
was not convinced-at least not then-that he was to act only as 
Hitler's mouthpiece. 
The first of these incidents occurred in connection with the pro-
posed attack on France. Hitler's Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of 
the War of October 9, 1939, requested the Commanders in Chief of 
the three Services to submit detailed plans for an attack in the 
West.9 Opposition to such an attack on France at this time was 
strong within the Armed Forces, and Keitel, who shared the view 
of that opposition, went to Hitler on November 4 to present the 
Army's case. Hitler accused him of obstructionism and of partici-
pation in a generals' conspiracy against him. "He demanded of me," 
Keitel wrote, "that I accept his views and represent them without 
reservations to the High Command of the Army ( OKW) ." 1° Keitel 
was deeply hurt, primarily, because Hitler doubted the quality in 
himself of which he was most proud: his loyalty as a soldier. He 
took the consequences of Hitler's accusations and asked for his 
dismissal. A second conference followed in which Hitler told Keitel 
that he rejected his request, that he furthermore did not wish to 
receive such requests, and that it was Keitel's duty to do his job in 
the position in which he, Hitler, had placed him.11 General Walther 
von Brauchitsch offered his opposition to Hitler's planned attack in 
the West in the same manner on November 23, 1939. He received 
a similar dressing down and offered his resignation which was sub-
sequently rejected.12 
This incident was by no means the last clash between the Fuehrer 
and his Chief of the OKW. When Hitler decided to entrust Gau-
leiter ( Party District Leader) Josef Terboven with the administra-
tion of the occupied Norwegian territory, Keitel again protested 
and received another dressing down in front of the assembled offi-
cers at the daily situation conference. A second attempt to place 
the administration of Norway in the hands of the Wehrmacht also 
failed.13 
8. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's H eadquarters, p. 13. 
9. H. R. Trevor-Roper ( ed.) , Blitzkrieg to Defeat: Hit ler's War Directives 1939-1945 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 13-14. 
10. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Walter Goerlitz (ed.), Generalfeldmarschall Keitel: V er-
brecher oder Offizier? Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW ( Goettingen: 
Musterschmidt Verlag, 1961), p. 223. 
11. Ibid., p. 224. 
12. Testimony by von Brauchitsch on August 9, 1946, IMT, XX, 575. 
13. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 230. 
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Another area of disagreement was over the role of Heinrich 
Himmler's police force in the occupied areas. The OKW protested 
vigorously against the arrival of Himmler's police detachments in 
the occupied areas of Poland. Nothing could be done to prevent it, 
since Hitler, who had already given his consent to Himmler, was 
not to be swayed. Consequently during the planning for t}le attack 
on the West, the OKW, having learned its lesson from Poland, took 
steps to keep Himmler's police out of France. Hitler gave his con-
sent to keep out Himmler's men, but Himmler managed to circum-
vent the restrictions of the OKW and created a special unit under 
the command of the notorious Reinhard Heydrich: disguised in 
field-gray Army uniforms and riding in vehicles with military license 
plates provided by Himmler, Heydrich' s detachment reached Paris.14 
In the light of these clashes between Keitel and Hitler, Wheeler-
Bennett's contention that "there is no evidence that Keitel ever 
uttered the remotest query to a single decision of the Fuehrer" is 
without historical foundation.15 
In spite of his difficulties with Hitler, Keitel managed to continue 
his assigned job. He admired Hitler's military abilities-things had 
gone well so far-and he considered the conclusion of the armistice 
with France as the zenith of his military career. The victory over 
France was to Keitel "the hour of retaliation for Versailles, a sensa-
tion mixed with the proud awareness of a unique campaign and 
the promise to honor and protect the soldierly honor of the van-
quished." He was pleased about his promotion to Generalfeld-
marschall, but he said that he was somewhat ashamed at the same 
time: in his opinion this distinction should have been reserved for 
field commanders only.16 
What Keitel admired in Hitler in the years before the war against 
the Soviet Union was the military leader, the strong head of state, 
and the man who had helped restore the strength of the Armed 
Forces. Perhaps his judgment of Hitler's military abilities was due 
to his limited understanding of strategy. On the other hand, some 
military historians argue that Hitler was "one of the most knowl-
edgeable and diversified military-technical specialists of his time." 17 
Keitel' s opposition to measures based upon ideological considera-
tions, such as the appointment of Gauleiter Terboven or the use of 
14. Jacques Delarue, The Gestapo: A History of Hvrror, trans. by Mervyn Savill (New 
York; Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1965 ), pp. 232-233. 
15. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, p. 429. 
16. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 235-238. 
17. H elmut R eiber (ed.) , Lagebesprechungen im Fuehrerhauptquartier: Protokollfrag-
mente aus Hitlers militaerischen Konferenzen 1942-1945 (Muencben; Deutscher Tascben-
buch Verlag G. m. b. H. & Co. KG, 1963 ), p. 23; Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler als mili-
taerischer Fuehrer: Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkom-
mandos der Wehrmacht (2d ed. rev.; Frankfurt am Main; Athenaeum Verlag, 1965), 
pp. 57-58. 
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SS Commandos 18 behind the front lines, shows that he had kept 
himself relatively free of the ideology of the movement. The honors 
and distinctions which he received were awarded to him by a 
grateful Hitler for loyalty and devotion to his work. 
General Field Marshal von Blomberg testified at Nuremberg that 
"it is general knowledge that Hitler kept Keitel at his side because 
he was convinced of his unconditional soldierly obedience and 
loyalty." 19 General Jodi called him "an obedient and dutyful 
soldier, too soft and too decent for Hitler-but upright, truthful and 
helpful." 20 Another analysis of Keitel's character was offered by 
Colonel General Franz Halder. It was more detailed and less 
colored by years of friendly relations than J odl' s: "He was extremely 
industrious, literally a work animal, extremely conscientious in his 
field, but in all he did he kept his personality out of it. . 
Originally, and I can vouch for it, he was by no means blind to the 
danger of Hitler. He fought persistently-persistently, but not 
energetically enough against the growth of the SS." 21 
Jodi, who worked closest with Keitel and perhaps knew him best, 
also testified of many instances when Keitel opposed Hitler. "But 
when Hitler then became rude and abusive, so that one had to be 
embarrassed because of the junior officers present, he resigned 
himself and avoided anything that could lead to such depressing 
scenes. He took flight into his work." 22 One such incident which 
perhaps best describes the kind of humiliation to which those in 
the Fuehrer's environment were exposed was related by Halder: 
"I can still hear Hitler's tone: 'Hey, Field Marshall' I asked Keitel 
about that later. He broke down and declared with tears in his eyes: 
'Halder, I am doing it for you [ the Army] I Don't you understand?' 
This indicates the path which brought him in connection with 
criminal things-but a wicked man, as one would read at times-
that he was not." 23 
Keitel himself offered evidence of his devotion to duty, not 
ideology. Throughout his memoirs, letters, and testimony, he 
stressed the point that his actions were guided by his sworn duty 
to the Supreme Commander. "We understood our task to assist 
Hitler in operative matters ordered and planned by him without 
having anything to do with the political motives for these actions. 
18. The SS ( Schutzstaffeln) consisted of certain military and police formations which 
were under the command of Heinrich Himmler. 
19. Affidavit by von Blomberg on February 26, 1946, IMT XL, 409. 
20. Affidavit by Jodl on June 17, 1946, ibid., 422. 
21. Peter Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1950), p. 115. 
22. Affidavit by Jodl on June 17, 1946, IMT, XL, 421. 
23. Peter Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder, p. 116. 
We were not asked to concern ourselves with them." 24 Although 
Keitel admitted that certain elements in Hitler's program contrib-
uted greatly to the "soldierly education," he emphasized that this 
meant by no means that he accepted the entire program of the 
National Socialist Party.25 This sentiment was a familiar one: the 
officer remains above politics and accepts only those points in the 
political program of the government which serve his class interests. 
The fact that Keitel maintained this attitude to the very end indi-
cates not only that he was unable to rid himself of the traditional 
view of the Army's role in the state but also that he apparently did 
not comprehend Hitler's role as the leader of a revolutionary 
movement. 
Hitler's statement in 1933 that he believed in the concept of 
Ueberparteilichkeit for the Armed Forces 26 had-at least in theory 
-become meaningless by February 4, 1938, when he had merged 
his political office with the office of Supreme Commander. In a 
speech to the graduating Officer's Class of 1938, Hitler returned to 
his old theme of creating a new and select class of politically and 
racially suitable leaders. 27 In the fall of 1939, he told his military 
commanders that the "creation of the W ehrmacht was possible only 
in connection with the ideological education of the people through 
the Party." 28 
A study of the Constitution of the Armed Forces reveals the 
extent to which the Armed Forces had become gleichgeschaltet: 
"The office of the Fuehrer, not unlike the position of the monarch in 
former times, constitutes a concentration of political and military 
rights." The document goes on to say that the major differences 
between the position of the monarch and the position of Hitler lies 
in the fact that the monarch's basis was the army, whereas "the 
position in which the Fuehrer stands and from which he speaks to 
the people as well as to the W ehrmacht, is the position expressed by 
the National Socialist people's movement, the Party." 
The author of the document, Johannes Heckel, admitted that 
there existed a "seemingly difficult" constitutional problem con-
24. Memorandum by Keitel to Dr. Otto Nelte, n . d. (Nelte File ) , Goerlitz, Keitel, 
p. 395. 
25. Ibid., p. 391. 
26. Speech by H itler to the generals on F ebruary 3 , 1933, in W alther H ofer (ed. ) . Der 
Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente 1933-1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Buecherei K. G., 
1957 ), p, 181. 
27. Hitler's " Rede vor dem O.ffiziersjahrgan g 1938" ( Speech to the entire year 's class 
of officers) on January 25, 1939, in the Reich Chancellery, cited in Dr . H ans-Adolf Jacobsen 
and Dr. W erner Jochm ann ( eds. ), Ausgewaehlte Dokumente zur Geschichte des National-
sozialismus 1933-1945 (Bielefeld: Neue Gesellschaft G. m. b. H ., 1961 ) , n. p. 
28. Speech by Hitler on November 23, 1939, to the Comm anders of the Armed Forces, 
ibid. 
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cerning the position of this "political leader" to the Armed Forces. 
But he quickly offered the solution: "He [the Fuehrer] represents 
a new type of head of state. He is neither professional 
soldier nor civilian, but a political fighter who assembles the people 
as his followers around himself. The power of the military 
command is therefore nothing but the military-technical expression 
of the already existing right of the Fuehrer." 29 
The Constitution of the Armed Forces conceded that the "legalis-
tic thinking of the past" would demand a guarantee for the separa-
tion of political from military power but added that "our constitu-
tional and administrative law knows neither normative nor institu-
tional guarantees. We do not have a guardian of the constitution. 
We have no supreme court because we have been taught 
by past experience that these are bound to fail. In accordance with 
the personalized order of our legal existence we see that guarantee 
in Hitler. It is his task and no one knows better than he does 
how he must lead the Armed Forces." 30 Hitler, as Fuehrer and 
Supreme Commander of the W ehrmacht, could thus quite legiti-
mately dress ideological goals in military orders and demand their 
execution according to principles of soldierly obedience, which 
derived from the general duties of the citizen.31 
Keitel apparently never comprehended the implications of the 
Constitution of the Armed Forces as to his own position. He ad-
mitted that the Army was penetrated by National Socialist ideas, 
but at the same time stubbornly insisted "that we [ the generals in 
the OKW] had nothing to do with the Party." 32 He fits well into 
the picture of the German officer which Lieutenant Fabian von 
Schlabrendorff, one of the active members of the resistance within 
the Army, drew after the war: "One of the main strengths of the 
German officer was his military one-sidedness. The normal German 
officer worked and lived in his profession. . But in his 
strength lay his weakness. His military one-sidedness made him 
incapable of passing judgment on anything outside his field, espe-
cially political matters." 33 
29. Johannes H eckel, W ehrverfassung und W ehrrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches, 
Paragraph 83, ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Helmut Krausnick, 
Anatomie des SS-Staates (2 vols.; Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter Verlag, 1965), 
I, 273. 
32. Memorandum by Keitel to Dr. Otto Nelte, n. d. (Nelte File ), Goerlitz, Keitel, 
p. 391. 
33. Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Ofjiziere gegen Hitler (Frankfurt am Main : Fischer 




The Failure of an Ideology 
The year 1941, not unlike the year 1938, was to bring a new turn-
ing point in the relations between the NSDAP and the Armed 
Forces. France had fallen in 1940, and Hitler, after a brief Balkan 
interlude, turned his attention in 1941 to his ideological enemy of 
long standing-Communism in the USSR. In the course of that 
turbulent year, Hitler personally took command of the Army while 
the military establishment as a whole found itself drawn closer into 
the ideology of the movement. · 
On December 18, 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 21, "Case 
Barbarossa": "The German Armed Forces must be prepared, even 
before the conclusion of the war against England, to crush Soviet 
Russia in a rapid campaign." 1 Possible military action against the 
Soviet Union had been the subject of a conference between Hitler 
and a number of top military leaders as early as July 31, 1940.2 
Concerned about the lack of troops for a campaign of this magni-
tude, Keitel sent a memorandum to Hitler in which he warned of 
a possible two-front war and of the danger of American intervention. 
The tone and content of Hitler's reply were such that Keitel once 
again asked for his dismissal and transfer to the front. Hitler, as 
usual, rejected his request. 3 
The war against the Soviet Union, unlike any of the preceding 
campaigns, bore a very definite ideological character. According 
to notes made by General Halder during Hitler's speech to the 
military leaders on March 28, 1941, Hitler described the coming 
conflict as a battle of ideologies in which Communists should not 
be treated as soldiers: the goal of the conflict was the destruction of 
the Communist intelligentsia. Commissars and members of the GPU 
( Soviet Secret State Police), Hitler said, were criminals and must, 
therefore, be treated as such. 4 Perhaps in anticipation of opposition 
from the military, he ended his speech, saying, "I do not demand 
1. Directive No. 21, "Case Barbarossa,'' cited in H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Blitzkrieg 
to Defeat: Hitler's War Directives 1989-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1965), p. 49. 
2. Walter Goerlitz (ed.), Generalfeldmarschall Keitel: V erbrecher oder O{fizier? 
Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW (Goettingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 
1961 ), p. 242, n. 10. 
3. "Memoirs 1938-1945,'' ibid., p. 244. 
4. Halder diary entry of March 30, 1941, cited in Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler: Reden 
und Proklamationen 1982-1945, Vol. II: Untergang (2 vols.; Muenchen: Sueddeutscher 
Verlag, 1965), 1682. 
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that the generals understand me, but I do demand that they obey 
my orders." 5 The ideological character of the coming war was 
further expressed in a series of special orders, notably the "Com-
missar Order." This order declared that captured Soviet officials 
and political Commissars would be treated as criminals and not as 
prisoners of war. When captured, they were to be shot on• the spot 
or turned over to the Field Sections of the SD ( Security Service) . 6 
The actual formulation of these orders began with a Fuehrer 
Directive to the Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, which charged 
him with carrying out "special tasks" in the conquered areas. 7 By 
order of Hitler, OKW then included in its Guidelines to Directive 
No. 21 the provision that the Reichsfuehrer SS was to perform "spe-
cial tasks in preparation for the political administration [ of the 
conquered areas]" within the operational area of the Armed Forces.8 
Military actions thus became connected with purely political actions, 
and the Armed Forces were caught in an undertaking which was 
guided by racial and ideological considerations.9 
Keitel's involvement in the formulation of these orders is difficult 
to determine. General Warlimont held that "there was only one 
man, Hitler, who was both officially and personally involved in the 
authorship and drafting . .; his unhappy Chief of OKW was 
also involved but only as a recipient." 10 But in a memorandum to 
his defense counsel, Keitel wrote: "I do not deny that I have had 
knowledge of all these orders, regardless of whether I signed them 
or not. I do not deny that Hitler talked about them with me and 
Colonel General J odl and that I transmitted them and supervised 
their execution." 11 Keitel claimed that he attempted to resist these 
orders because he was afraid that, as in Poland, Himmler would 
"abuse these measures to establish order behind the front." 12 At 
Nuremberg, Keitel admitted that he and the other generals should 
have resisted these orders, "but we saw only the military situation 
as it was; we let ourselves be guided by this as well as the 
suggestive powers of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander who 
5. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 258. 
6. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-1945, trans. by R. H. Barry 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 161. The SD (Sicherheitsdienst) 
or Security Service was an agency of the Reu:hsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police 
H einrich Himmler. The function of the SD in the East was to prepare the way for the 
future political settlement of the conquered areas. See Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The 
Russian German Conflict, 1941-1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965), 
p. 61. 
7. Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegfuehrung 1940-1941 (Frank-
furt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fuer W ehrwesen, 1965), pp. 523-524. 
8. Guidelines to Directive No. 21, IMT, XXVI, 54. 
9. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, pp. 525-526. 
10. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 170. 
11. Memorandum by Keitel to Dr. Nelte, Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 395. 
12. "Memoirs 1938-1945," ibid., p. 259. 
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had impressed us greatly with his success in Poland and France." 13 
In his final plea before the International Military Tribunal, Dr. 
Otto Nelte said that his client knew the criminal nature of the orders 
in question but that he was unable to evade them.14 Evasion under 
the circumstances would have meant either resignation, disobedi-
ence, or, in the extreme, suicide. Attempts to resign had proven 
futile in the past. At one occasion Hitler had driven Keitel _ to a 
suicide attempt, but J odl managed to take his pistol from him in 
time.15 To disobey Hitler's orders, however, appears to have been 
unthinkable for Keitel. 
The conflict with the USSR signified not only the penetration 
of military considerations with ideological concepts but also a new 
arrangement in the structure of the High Command of the Armed 
Forces. General Halder noted in his diary entry of December 15, 
1941: "First serious discussion with the Commander in Chief [ von 
Brauchitsch] regarding the situation; he is most depressed and sees 
no way out of the situation." 16 Two days later, von Brauchitsch 
resigned, a sick and broken man.17 The situation created by the 
resignation of the Commander in Chief of the Army was not unlike 
the one on February 4, 1938. Hitler saw an opportunity and 
quickly announced that thenceforth he was in personal command 
of the Army in the Eastern theater of war. His "Proclamation 
Concerning the Change in the High Command" explained in its 
introductory section that his assumption of the office of Commander 
in Chief of the Army was "the logical development" of his decree of 
February 4, 1938. The second part of the proclamation was ad-
dressed to the "Soldiers of the Army and the W affen SS," and it 
exhorted the troops to stay firm in their "loyalty and obedience." 18 
Hitler's comment to Halder on the changes of command indicated 
his hardly veiled contempt for the traditional work of general staff 
officers: "That little bit of operations work anyone can do. The job 
of Commander in Chief of the Army is to educate the Army in the 
National Socialist spirit. I don't have a single Army general who 
would do that job in my sense. I have therefore decided to take 
command of the Army myself." 19 This was one of those rare 
13. Memorandum by Keitel to Dr. Nelte, ibid., p. 393. 
14. Office of United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi 
Conspiracy and A ggression, Supplement B, Final Argument by Dr. Otto Nelte ( 8 vols. an d 
two supplementary vols. A and B; Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946 ) , 
p. 242. 
15. T estimony of Jodi, on June 6, 1946, IMT, XV, 440. 
16. Halder diary entry of D ecember 15, 1941, cited in Warlimont, Inside Hitler's 
Headquarters, p. 212. 
17. "Memoirs 1938-1945," Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 286. 
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J~is~i'.'erlautbarung u eber den Okerkommandowechsel," cited in Domarus, Hitler, II, 
19, P eter Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1950 ), pp. 214-215. 
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admissions by Hitler that the Party, in spite of its clamoring about 
the National Socialist W ehrmacht, had failed to convert even the 
generals. 
As a result of the changes in the command of the Army, the 
entire organization of the Armed Forces, which had already been 
unduly strained by Hitler's arbitrary methods, entered an· acceler-
ated process of disintegration from which it never recovered. Gen-
eral Adolf Heusinger recalled the situation: "No one is at the 
moment responsible for training, organization, replacements, ad-
ministration. . . . Keitel is supposed to undertake the greater 
part of these difficult jobs, to some extent as Hitler's deputy. Soon 
he won't know whether he is Chief of the OKW or Deputy Com-
mander in Chief of the Army." 20 Warlimont claims that no one 
ever defined which areas of competence of the Army's Commander 
in Chief were now to be handled by Keitel. To complicate matters 
even further, the responsibility of the Army High Command was re-
stricted to the Eastern front, and as far as operations were con-
cerned, there was no longer a unified command of the Armed Forces. 
Apart from Hitler, no one had any authority over all the forces of 
the Army and, therefore, over the reserves, and no one else could 
order movements of troops from one theater of war to another.21 
In short, Hitler, as Supreme Commander, was conducting strategy 
in all theaters of war, while at the same time, as Commander in 
Chief of the Army, he was conducting operations in the Eastern 
theater of war.22 
Keitel' s position under the new arrangement defies an exact 
definition: technically he was still the Chief of the OKW. But the 
Armed Forces Leadership Staff of the OKW was no longer used 
for the Eastern front, where Hitler preferred to deal directly with 
the General Staff of the Army. Keitel said at Nuremberg that "the 
Fuehrer dealt knowingly and purposely in two ways: he wanted 
certain competition concerning the disposition of troops and the 
distribution of ordnance supplies of all kinds in order to have per-
sonal inside knowledge to reach his own final decision." 23 The Field 
Marshal was fully aware of the abnormality of this situation and 
attempted to convince Hitler to appoint a successor to von Brau-
chitsch; when this was rejected, he attempted another organizational 
solution which was designed to bring some order and stability into 
20. Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit: Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee, 
1923-1945 (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, 1957), p. 155. 
21. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 216. 
22. Statement by Keitel "The Position and Powers of the Chief of the OKW" on 
October 9, 1945, Nazi Conspfracy and Aggression, VIII, 676. 
23. Ibid. 
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the confused situation. It, too, was rejected by Hitler without an 
explanation. 24 
It appears that after December 19, 1941, Keitel was completely 
removed from strategic and operative tasks, an area in which Jodl 
became more and more Hitler's sole adviser.25 Although he attended 
the daily situation conferences with Hitler, J odl, the Chief of the 
General Staff of the Army, and other guests, Keitel's role there, as 
can be seen from the records of the conferences, consisted mainly 
in asking questions to clarify minor points or in supplying details 
of information on administrative and logistical problems.26 He no 
longer had any influence on appointments to positions in the Wehr-
macht: this role had been taken over by Lieutenant General Rudolf 
Schmundt. 27 In this "mixture of cloister and concentration camp," 28 
the "Fuehrer Head Quarters," Keitel played his part as Hitler's 
"lightning rod" 29 and military secretary. But nothing indicates that 
his devotion to his duty or his loyalty to the Supreme Commander 
was affected by his humiliating position. On the contrary, as Hitler's 
suspicion of the generals increased and as his military fortunes 
declined, Keitel reassured him of his loyalty and continued to defend 
his decisions against criticism from outsiders.30 
The increasing influence of National Socialist ideology on the 
nature of the war became apparent with a Fuehrer Decree of 
March 1, 1942, addressed to all departments of the Party, the State, 
and the Armed Forces. In it, Jews, Freemasons, "and their allies" 
were referred to as the cause of the present war and therefore, so 
the decree reads, "the systematic spiritual battle against these forces 
is a task necessitated by the war." Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg 
was entrusted to conduct investigations of confiscated materials 
from lodges, synagogues, and Jewish archives with the consent of 
the Chief of the OKW.31 
In June, 1942, Keitel issued a letter in which he announced that 
24. Manuscript by Keitel, "Stellung und Befugnisse des Chefs OKW," on August 15, 
1945 (Nelte File), Goerlitz, Keitel, pp. 317-322. 
25. Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler als militaerischer Fuehrer: Erkenntnisse und Er-
fahrongen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (2d ed. rev.; 
Frankfurt am Main: Athenaeum Verlag, 1965), p. 175. 
26. Helmut Heiber (ed.), Lagebesprechungen im Fuehrerhauptquartier: Protokollfrag-
mente aus Hitlers militaerischen Konferenzen 1942-1945 (Muenchen: Deutscher Taschen-
buch Verlag G. m. b. H. & Co. KG, 1963), passim. 
27. Schramm, Hitler als militaerischer Fuehrer, p. 176. 
28. Testimony by Jodi on June 3, 1946, IMT, XV, 295. 
29. Affidavit by Hermann Goering on February 14, 1946, (Nelte File), Goerlitz, 
Keitel, p. 271, n. 89. 
30. Bor, Gespraeche mit Halder, p. 23; Major General Bernhard von Lossberg quoted 
in Goerlitz, Keitel, p. 288, n. 144; Affidavit by Hermann Goering on February 14, 1946 
(Nelte File), ibid., p. 271, n. 89. 
31. Fuehrererlass of March l, 1942, cited in Walther Hofer (ed.), Der National-
sozialismus: Dokumente 1933-1945 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Buecherei KG 1957 ), 
p. 248. 
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Hitler had informed him that it was now necessary to bring about 
"unconditional agreement in ideological matters" between the head 
of state and the Officer Corps. Keitel wrote that he hoped to bring 
the Officer Corps closer to its Supreme Commander and that, by 
doing so, to strengthen the belief in the final victory and the will to 
persevere.32 Barely six weeks later, the High Command of the Army 
issued an order, again over Keitel's signature, which provided for 
the appointment of officers in charge of W ehrgeistige Fuehrung.33 
How effective these officers were in influencing the troops is dif-
ficult to determine. It seems though that the call for increased 
political schooling found a favorable response with some troop 
commanders. The Commanding General of the XIX Army Corps, 
General Ferdinand Schoemer, issued a special order on February 1, 
1943, on his own initiative, which was then distributed by the High 
Command of the Army to all divisional commanders as a good 
example of the new type of leadership.34 General Schoemer stated 
in this order that each officer under his command must establish 
close relations with his men and that he must impress upon the 
soldiers that the war against the USSR was an ideological war in 
which there were only two alternatives, "total victory or death." 
"It is obvious," he wrote, "that the war cannot be won with the 
discipline of the old army alone. The soldier of to-day wins with 
his weapons and his W eltanschauung." The nature of the previous 
political instruction-at least in Schoemer's view-can be gathered 
from his comment: "I absolutely forbid in the future the cheap 
kind of lecture in prayer-mill style. . . I forbid these intel-
lectual and high sounding lectures during which one soldier gets 
his sound sleep and another one just sits there and looks stupid." 35 
It seems doubtful that General Schoemer's example was followed 
by many troop commanders. In December, 1943, OKW again had 
to be told to increase the political education of the troops and to 
cooperate with the Party Chancellery: Hitler ordered the creation 
of a National Socialist Leadership Staff ( NSF Staff) within the 
OKW and stated that "the Chief of the NSF Staff acts in the 
execution of his office under my immediate command. He will 
work in agreement with the NSDAP as the carrier of the political 
32. Letter by Keitel to the Commander of the Armed Forces of June 1, 1942, in 
Waldemar Besson (ed.), "Dokumentation: Zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialistischen 
Fuebrungsoffiziers (NSFO)," Vierteliahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte, IX (January, 1961), 84. 
33. Order by High Command of the Anny of July 15, 1942, ibid., pp, 84-85. The 
term wehrgeistige Fuehrong literally means "leadership in the spirit of national defense." 
It was used in the beginning stages of the program as a euphemism for the training of 
political fanatics. 
34. Ibid., p. 78. 
35. Special Order by the Commanding General of the XIX Army Corps of February 1, 
1941, ibid., pp. 87-89. 
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will." 36 This decree represents the final attempt to make the 
W ehrmacht a National Socialist instrument of power. The mere 
fact that it was necessary to create such an institution seems to indi-
cate that National Socialist ideas had not gained the kind of foot-
hold within the Armed Forces which was deemed necessary by the 
Party. 
In a report of December 20, 1944, Hauptbereichsleiter 37 Willy 
Ruder stated that 1074 National Socialist Leadership Officers ( NSF 
Officers) were employed on a full-time basis and 57,552 on a part-
time basis. He also admitted that of the sixty-one General Staff 
officers who had participated in special NSF training schools not 
one was deemed suitable for future employment as an NSF Officer. 
Ruder complained about their distinterested attitude and attributed 
this to their traditionally Prussian outlook.38 Hitler himself took an 
active part in the re-education program at his own headquarters: 
in a speech at the end of January, 1944, he encouraged his senior 
officers to follow his leadership with greater determination as the 
situation got worse. The response among the officers in Hitler's 
environment to the NSF Program seems to have been mixed. For 
example, General Warlimont wrote: "In HQ Area 2 we contrived 
to avoid being subjected to this Party supervisory system in military 
clothing, which significantly did not work through the 'normal 
channels.' When the NSFO Headquarters asked us to accept an 
NSFO Officer, the Staff Adjudant, who was a war-disabled colonel 
replied: 'we've got no time here for such nonsense.'" 39 
Keitel' s involvement in the planning and execution of the NSF 
Program was only marginal: he received the necessary orders and 
transmitted them. When on January 7, 1944, General Hermann 
Reinecke was appointed Chief of the NSF Staff in the OKW, Hitler, 
Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, Keitel, and several other officers par-
ticipated in a conference in which Reinecke explained his plans for 
the implementation of the Fuehrer Decree of December 22, 1943. At 
one occasion during that conference Keitel attempted to dispel Hit-
ler's fear that the NSF Officers might run into resistance from the 
rank and file. When he attempted to make a suggestion as to the 
appointment of an Army representative within the NSF Staff, Hitler 
quickly suggested General Schoemer because he was a "fanatic." 
Keitel agreed, saying that such a position should indeed be held by a 
36. Fuehrer D ecree of December 22, 1943, ibid., p. 94. 
37. The title Hauptbereichsleiter is a Party rank. It is equivalent to the rank of 
section chief within the Party Chancellery. 
38. Draft of report "l Jahr nationalsozialistische Fuebrungsarbeit in der Wehrmacht," 
by Willy Ruder of December 20, 1944, Besson, "Dokumentation," p. 81, n. 7. 
39. Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, p. 420. 
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fanatic who could "fire up the men who are not doing their job." 40 
The entire NSF Officer Program was significant in a number of 
respects. It indicated that as late as 1944-1945 the Party had serious 
doubts about the National Socialist attitude of the Armed Forces. 
The fact that the NSF Leadership Staff in the OKW was directly 
responsible to Hitler and Reichsleiter Bormann and not to J(eitel as 
Chief of the OKW indicates that Hitler must have had doubts about 
the OKW's willingness to carry out such a program. The NSF 
Officer Program seems to have been dictated to a great degree by 
the desperate military situation, although the leadership of the 
program rejected such a notion.41 But the timing of the program 
and the concentration of the appeal on the troops indicate that the 
overall objective was to instill in the troops a fanatical will to 
resist the enemy and to hold the line. Wofuer Kaempfen Wir?, a 
book especially approved by Hitler for the purpose of training 
officers and men in the National Socialist spirit, provided an exam-
ple. It contained, of course, the ideological windowdressing: the 
Reich is a voelkische unit, the Germanic tribes had a heroic history, 
the Lebensraum theme is of greatest importance, and the historic 
mission of National Socialism _is to create a society for all those of 
Germanic blood. But the essence of the book was its appeal to 
loyalty and steadfastness in the face of the enemy: "We know 
that the most fanatic enemy falters on an even more fanatic adver-
sary. Neither the numbers nor the moral strength of the enemy 
are inexhaustible. Faith, loyalty, and an iron will 
will give our weapons the victory." 42 The appeal made in this 
work was essentially an appeal to the soldierly virtues, to uncondi-
tional obedience and loyalty; the ideological element played only a 
secondary role. 
In an order of August, 1944, General Reinecke stressed this point 
even more: "Considering the present situation, I must point out 
that it is not the task of the NSF Officer to provide political educa-
tion. He must instead concentrate on instilling fanaticism in the 
troops." 48 This attitude had, in fact, already been voiced by Ruder 
as early as April, 1944, when he quoted Hitler as saying that he 
[Hitler] demanded that his officers be not "only" loyal to the Party 
40. Record of Fuehrer Conference with General Reinecke, Martin Bormann, Keitel et al., 
on January 7, 1944, in Gerhard L. Weinberg (ed.), "Dokumentation: Adolf Hitler und der 
NS-Fuehrungsoffizier ( NSFO )," Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte, XII ( October, 1964 ), 
446-456. 
41. Letter by the Commander of the Relief Army on May 14, 1943, Besson, "Doku-
mentation," p. 90. 
42. Wofuer Kaempfen Wir? cited in Dr. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Dr. Werner Joch-
mann (eds.), Ausgewaehlte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1933-1945 
(Bielefeld: Neue Gesellschaft G. m. b. H., 1961), n. p. 
43. Letter from General Reinecke of August 3, 1944, Besson "Dokumentation," p. 113. 
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and its goals but that the officers must be the "most fanatic repre-
sentatives of the National Socialist State." 44 
Although it is not possible to measure in any significant way the 
actual influence of the NSF Program on the Armed Forces, the 
increasing emphasis on loyalty and obedience in the appeals of the 
NSF Staff during the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 seems 
to indicate that ideological training as a means to instill fanaticism 
was by and large a failure. Barely a month before the collapse of 
the Third Reich, a party official who had a chance to observe the 
effects of the NSF Program wrote to his superior about the lack of 
conviction in the ranks even of the NSF Officers. He appealed to 
his superior to see to it that the control of the program be removed 
from the Fuehrer Head Quarters and given directly to Reichsleiter 
Bormann: "Only the Party can now force a decision," he thought.45 
44. Speech by Willy Ruder to high ranking party functionaries on F ebruary 23, 1944, 
in Munich, ibid., p. 106. 
45. Memorandum to Hauptamtsleiter H einrich Walkenhorst from Pg. Buergel of April 4, 





The rise of National Socialism as an all-embracing philosophy of 
life constituted perhaps the most far-reaching impact on recent 
German history. It swept into power an unknown Austrian corporal 
and enabled him to become the unlimited dictator of Europe 
within a few years. In Germany the National Socialist revolution 
with its avowed goal of Gleichschaltung affected every aspect of 
life and every institution of society. Even the German Army, tradi-
tionally a power in itself, was unable to keep aloof from the revo-
lutionary dynamics of the National Socialist movement. 
Although the Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic attempted to 
play the traditional role of a state within the state by attempting to 
stay ahove politics, the promises of Adolf Hitler to restore the Army 
to its former position of power struck a responsive chord in the 
Corps of Officers. His pseudo-military bearing and language, his 
hatred of the Social Democratic "system," and his ability to arouse 
enthusiasm in an apathetic Corps of Officers made the Reichswehr 
leaders forget, that once started, a revolution of this kind would 
not stop at the barracks' gates. Their political ignorance, fostered 
by their traditional distaste for anything political, proved to be an 
invaluable asset for a manipulator of Hitler's skills. The Fuehrer 
went to great lengths to prove his good will towards the Army. 
When he eliminated Ernst Roehm and his SA, Hitler fulfilled the 
Army's greatest desire: to be once again the only arms bearer in 
the Reich. 
But Hitler's gift to the military leaders proved to be a Trojan 
horse. The independence of the Reichswehr was threatened when 
the 100,000 man army was flooded with conscripts of a new genera-
tion who carried the seeds of the revolution into the once tightly 
controlled Reichswehr. A second attack on the "state within the 
state" came from another direction. Scandals and trumped-up 
charges as well as outright murder removed a number of leading 
personalities within the Reichswehr until the conditions were ripe 
for Hitler's second move: the assumption of direct command over 
the Armed Forces on February 4, 1938. With this political master-
stroke the High Command of the Armed Forces was quietly changed 
from an agency with relative independence from politics into a tool 
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for Hitler, the politician. Wilhelm Keitel, an efficient bureaucrat, 
who, like most of his fellow officers, did not comprehend that he 
was participating in a revolution, was elevated to the post of Chief 
of the High Command. Although the Party boasted of having 
created a National Socialist Wehrmacht, neither Keitel nor most of 
the generals were National Socialists. The key factor in Hitler's 
gaining direct control of the Armed Forces was his skillful ~anipu-
lation of power and his uncanny sense of timing rather than his 
ability to sway the generals to a National Socialist point of view. 
"Nothing convinces the soldier as quickly as success," Keitel once 
said.1 The military successes in Poland and France undoubtedly 
served well to establish the Army's con.fidence in its self-appointed 
leader and Supreme Commander. The military conflict with the 
Soviet Union demanded, however, not only that the Army have 
confidence in Hitler's military leadership but that it identify with 
the ideological causes of this war: the extermination of the so-
called ''biological basis of Bolshevism." Hitler realized that the 
ideological commitment of his generals and of the Army as a whole 
was sadly lacking. The resignation of General von Brauchitsch in 
1941 seemed to provide an answer to this problem. Rather than 
appoint a successor Hitler repeated his performance of February 4, 
1938, and personally took command of the Armies in the East to 
educate the troops in the National Socialist spirit. The High Com-
mand of the Armed Forces was reduced to playing the part of a 
military secretariat with drastically curtailed responsibilities. 
The Chief of the OKW, whose functions now seemed to be dic-
tated mostly by Hitler's needs, rather than the Army's, became a 
pathetic figure: disliked by most field commanders and humiliated 
by Hitler, he was yet unable to free himself from his traditional 
concepts of honor and duty. "Loyalty is the core of honor" 2 had 
been his motto throughout his military career; he was proud of 
having been Hitler's "faithful shieldbearer." 3 Keitel attempted to 
reconcile his participation in criminal and unsoldierly acts with his 
code of honor by pointing to his sworn duty to unquestioning obe-
dience. Whether he ever reconciled these acts with his conscience 
could not be determined. 
Hitler's attempt to educate the Army in the spirit of National 
Socialism must be called a failure. The last minute NSFO Program 
was an admittance that the majority of the Army had not committed 
1. Walter Goerlitz ( ed. ) , Generalfeldmarschall Keitel: Verbrecher oder Offi,zierP 
Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente des Chefs OKW (Goettingen: Musterscbmidt Verlag, 
1961 ), p. 406. 
2. Ibid., p. 434. 
3. Ibid., p. 405. 
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itseH to the ideology of the Party. The failure of the NSFO Pro-
gram was demonstrated by the fact that its appeals fell largely on 
deaf ears. With the worsening military situation in 1944, the ideo-
logical element in the program was gradually replaced by attempts 
to instill a kind of nihilistic fanaticism in the troops. As for Keitel, 
he appears rather as the prototype of the unpolitical military pro-
fessional who, steeped in the concepts of another age, found himseH 
involved in issues outside his field of specialization. Like most 
other military leaders he continued to do his job and ignored the 
moral issues involved in being "the devil's general," because there 
was no one to tell him how to resolve them. Hitler's attempt to 
create a National Socialist Army through a slowly evolving program 
of political indoctrination beginning in 1933 was a failure. Although 
the pressures of the Eastern campaign brought in their wake an 
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